Early Cultural Writings
CONTENTS
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The Harmony of Virtue
Book One
Keshav Ganesh — Broome Wilson
Keshav — My dear Broome, how opportune is your arrival! You will
save me from the malady of work, it may be, from the dangerous opium of solitude.
How is it I have not seen you for the last fortnight?
Wilson ——— Surely, Keshav, you can understand the exigencies of the Tripos?
Keshav —— Ah, you are a happy man. You can do what you are told. But put off
your academical aspirations until tomorrow and we will talk. The cigarettes are
on the mantelpiece — pardon my indolence! — and the lucifers are probably stowed
on the fruit— shelf. And here is coffee and a choice between cake and biscuits.
Are you perfectly happy?
Wilson ——— In Elysium. But do not let the cigarettes run dry; the alliance of
a warm fire and luxurious cushions will be too strong for my vigilance. Do you
mean to tell me you can work here?
Keshav —— Life is too precious to be wasted in labour, & above all this
especial moment of life, the hour after dinner, when we have only just enough
energy to be idle. Why, it is only for this I tolerate the wearisome activity of
the previous twelve hours.
Wilson ——— You are a living paradox. Is it not
just like you to pervert indolence into the aim of life?
Keshav
— Why, what other aim can there be?
Wilson ——— Duty, I presume.
Keshav
— I cannot consent to cherish an opinion until I realise the meaning of duty.
Wilson
— I suppose I have pledged myself to an evening of metaphysics. We do our
duty when we do what we ought to do.
Keshav
— A very lucid explanation; but how do we know
Page – 11 that we are doing what we ought to do? Wilson — Why, we must do what society requires of us. Keshav —— And must we do that, even when society requires something dissonant with our nature or repugnant to our convictions? Wilson ——— I conceive so. Keshav —— And if society requires us to sacrifice our children or to compel a widow to burn herself we are bound to comply? Wilson ——— No; we should only do what is just and good. Keshav — Then the fiat of society is not valid; duty really depends on something quite different. Wilson — It appears so. Keshav —— Then what is your idea of that something quite different on which duty depends? Wilson ——— Would it be wrong to select morality? Keshav — Let us inquire. But before that is possible, let me know what morality is or I shall not know my own meaning. Wilson — Morality is the conduct our ethical principles require of us. Keshav —— Take me with you. This ethical principle is then personal, not universal? Wilson — I think so. For different localities different ethics. I am not a bigot to claim infallibility for my own country. Keshav — So we must act in harmony with the code of ethics received as ideal by the society we move in? Wilson — I suppose it comes to that. Keshav —— But, my dear Broome, does not that bring us back to your previous theory that we should do what society requires of us? Wilson ——— I am painfully afraid it does. Keshav —— And we are agreed that this is not an accurate plumb line? Wilson ——— Yes. Keshav —— You see the consequence?
Wilson ——— I see I must change my ground and say that we must do what our
personal sense of the right and just requires of us.
Page – 12 Keshav — For example if my personal sense of the right and just, tells me that to lie is meritorious, it is my duty to lie to the best of my ability. Wilson — But no one could possibly think that. Keshav —— I think that the soul of Ithacan Ulysses has not yet completed the cycle of his transmigrations, nor would I wrong the author of the Hippias by ignoring his conclusions. Or why go to dead men for an example? The mould has not fallen on the musical lips of the Irish Plato nor is Dorian Gray forgotten on the hundred tongues of Rumour. Wilson ——— If our sense of right is really so prone to error, we should not rely upon it. Keshav —— Then, to quote Mrs Mountstuart, you have just ..succeeded in telling me nothing. Duty is not based on our personal sense of the right and just. Wilson ——— I allow it is not. Keshav — But surely there is some species of touchstone by which we can discern between the false and the true? Wilson — If there is I cannot discover it. Keshav —— Ah, but do try again. There is luck in odd numbers. Wilson ——— The only other touchstone I can imagine is religion; and now I come to think of it, religion is an infallible touchstone. Keshav —— I am glad you think so; for all I know at present you are very probably right. But have you any reason for your conviction? Wilson ——— A code of morality built upon religion has no commerce with the demands of society or our personal sense of the right and just, but is the very law of God. Keshav — I will not at present deny the reality of a personal God endowed with passions & prejudices; that is not indispensable to our argument. But are there not many religions and have they not all their peculiar schemes of morality? Wilson — No doubt, but some are more excellent than others.
Keshav —— And do
you cherish the opinion that your own
Page – 13
peculiar
creed — I believe it to be Christianity without Christ — is
indubitably the most excellent of all religions?
Wilson —— By far the most excellent.
Keshav
— And your own ethical scheme, again the Christian without the emotional
element, the best of all ethical schemes?
Wilson ——— I have no doubt of it.
Keshav
— And they are many who dissent from you, are there not?
Wilson ——— Oh
without doubt.
Keshav —— And you would impose your ethical scheme on them?
Wilson ——— No; but I imagine it to be the goal whither all humanity is
tending.
Keshav —— That is a very different question. Do you think that when a man's
life is in harmony with his own creed, but not with yours, he is therefore not
virtuous, or in your own phrase, deviates from his duty?
Wilson ——— God forbid!
Keshav —— Then you really do believe that a man
does his duty when he lives in harmony with the ethical scheme patronised by his
own religion, as a Mohammadan if he follows the injunctions of the Prophet, a
Hindu if he obeys the Vedic Scriptures, a Christian, if his life is a long self—
denial.
Wilson ——— That I admit.
Keshav —— Then the ethical scheme of Islam is
as much thievery law of God, as the ethical scheme of Christianity, and the
morals of Hinduism are not less divine than the morals of Islam.
Wilson ——— I hardly understand how you arrive at that conclusion.
Keshav —— Did you not say, Broome, that religion is an infallible test of
duty, because it is the very law of God?
Wilson ——— I still say so.
Keshav
— And that everyone must adopt his own religion as the test of what he should
do or not do?
Wilson
— I cannot deny it.
Keshav —— Then must you not either admit the reason to be
Page – 14
invalid or that anyone's peculiar religion, to whatever species it may belong, is the very law of God?
Wilson — I prefer the
second branch of the dilemma.
Keshav — But tho'
every religion is the very law of God,
nevertheless you will often find one enjoining a practice which to another is an abomination. And can God contradict himself?
Wilson — You mistake
the point. Islam, Hinduism, indeed
all Scriptural religions were given, because the peoples professing them were not capable of receiving a higher light.
Keshav — Is not God
omnipotent?
Wilson — A limited God
is not God at all.
Keshav — Then was it
not within his omnipotent power to so guide the world, that there would be no necessity for different
dealings with different peoples?
Wilson — It was within
his power, but he did not choose.
Keshav — Exactly: he
did not choose. He of set purpose preferred a method which he knew would bring him to falsehood
and injustice.
Wilson — What words
you use! The truth is merely that
God set man to develop under certain conditions and suited his methods to those conditions.
Keshav — Oh, then God
is practically a scientist making an experiment; and you demand for him reverence and obedience
from the creature vivisected. Then I can only see one other explanation. Having created certain conditions he could not
receive the homage of mankind without various and mutually dissentient revelations of his will.
Now imagine a physician with theosophical power who for purposes of gain so modified the climatic features of Judaea
& Arabia that the same disease required two distinct methods of treatment in the one & the other. This he does wilfully and
deliberately and with foreknowledge of the result. As soon as his end is assured, our physician goes to Judaea and gives the people
a drug which, he tells them, is the sole remedy for their disease, but all others are the property of quacks and will eventually
induce an increase of the malady. Five years later the same
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physician goes
off to Arabia and here he gives them another drug of an
accurately opposite nature about which he imparts the same
instructions. Now if we remember that the climatic conditions which
necessitated the deception, were the deliberate work of the
deceiver, shall we not call that physician a liar and an impostor? Is
God a liar? or an impostor?
Wilson — We must not
measure the Almighty by our poor mortal
standards.
Keshav — Pshaw,
Broome, if the legislator overrides his own laws, how
can you hope that others will observe them?
Wilson — But if God in
his incomprehensible wisdom and goodness —
Keshav —
Incomprehensible indeed! If there is any meaning in words, the
God you have described, can neither be wise nor good. Will you
show me the flaw in my position?
Wilson — I
cannot discover it.
Keshav — Then your
suspicion is born of your disgust at the conclusion
to which I have forced you.
Wilson — I am afraid
it is.
Keshav —
Well, shall we go on with the discussion or should I stop here?
Wilson — Certainly let
us go on. I need not shy at a truth however
disagreeable.
Keshav —
First let me give you a glass of this champagne. I do not keep
any of those infernal concoctions of alcohol and perdition of
which you in Europe are so enamoured. Now here is the
conclusion I draw from all that we have been saying: There are two
positions open to you. One is that of the fanatic. You may say that
you and those who believe with you are the specially chosen
of God to be the receptacles of his grace and that all who
have heard and rejected his gospel together with those who have
not so much as imagined its possibility must share a similar
fate and go into the outer darkness where there is wailing and
gnashing of teeth. If that is the line you take up, my answer is
that God is an unjust God and the wise will prefer the torments of
the damned to any communion with him. The fanatic of
course would be ready with his retort that the potter
Page – 16
has a right to
do what he will with his vessels. At that point I usually abandon
the conversation; to tell him that a metaphor is no argument
would be futile. Even if he saw it, he would reply that God's ways
are incomprehensible and therefore we should
accept them
without a murmur. That is a position which I have not the patience
to undermine, nor if I had it, have I sufficient
self-control to
preserve my gravity under the ordeal.
Wilson — I
at least, Keshav, am not in danger of burdening your patience. I
have no wish to evade you by such a back-door as that.
Keshav — Then is it
not plain to you, that you must abandon the
religious basis as unsound?
Wilson — Yes, for you
have convinced me that I have been talking nonsense
the whole evening.
Keshav — Not at all,
Broome: only you like most men have not accustomed
yourself to clear and rigorous thought.
Wilson — I am afraid,
logic is not sufficiently studied.
Keshav — Is
it not studied too much? Logic dwindles the river of thought
into a mere canal. The logician thinks so accurately that he
is seldom right. No, what we want is some more of that sense
which it is a mockery to call common.
Wilson —
But if we were to eliminate the divine element from the
balance, would not religion be a possible basis?
Keshav —
No, for religious ethics would then be a mere expression of
will on the part of Society. And that is open to the criticism that
the commands of Society may be revolting to the right and just
or inconsistent with the harmony of life.
Wilson —
But supposing everyone to interpret for himself the ethics
approved by his own creed?
Keshav —
The Inquisitors did that. Do you consider the result justified
the method?
Wilson —
The Inquisitors?
Keshav — They were a
class of men than whom you will find none more
scrupulous or in their private lives more gentle, chivalrous & honourable, or in their public conduct more obedient to their
sense of duty. They tortured the bodies of a few, that the souls
of thousands might live. They did murder in the
Page – 17
sight of the
Lord and looked upon their handiwork and saw that it was good.
Wilson — My dear
Keshav, surely that is extravagant.
Keshav —
Why, do you imagine that they were actuated by any other
motive?
Wilson —
Yes, by the desire to preserve the integrity of the Church.
Keshav — And is not
that the first duty of every Christian?
Wilson — Only by the
permissible method of persuasion.
Keshav —
That is your opinion but was it theirs? Duty is a phantasm spawned
in the green morass of human weakness & ignorance, but
perpetuated by vague thought and vaguer sentiment. And so
long as we are imperatively told to do our duty, without knowing
why we should do it, the vagueness of private judgment, the
cruelty of social coercion will be the sole arbiters and the saint
will be a worse enemy of virtue than the sinner. Will you have
another cigarette?
Wilson —
Thanks, I will. But, Keshav, I
am not disposed to leave the discussion with this purely
negative result. Surely there is some guiding principle which should
modify and harmonize our actions. Or are you favourable to an
anarchy in morals?
Keshav — No, Broome. If culture and taste were universal,
principle would then be a superfluous note in the world's composition. But so
long as men are crude, without tact, formless, incapable of a
balanced personality, so long the banner of the ideal must be waved
obtrusively before the eyes of men, and education remain a
necessity, so long must the hateful phrase, a higher morality, mean
something more than empty jargon of socialists. Yes, I think
there is that guiding principle you speak of, or at least we may
arrive at something like it, if we look long enough.
Wilson —
Then do look for it, Keshav. I am sure you will find something
original and beautiful. Come, I will be idle tonight and
abandon the pursuit of knowledge to waste time in the pursuit
of thought. Begin and I will follow my leader.
Keshav —
Before I begin, let me remove one or two of those popular
fallacies born of indolence which encumber the wings
Page – 18
of the
speculator. And first let me say, I will not talk of duty: it is a word I do
not like, for it is always used in antagonism to pleasure, and
brings back the noisome savour of the days when to do what I was
told, was held out as my highest legitimate aspiration. I
will use instead the word virtue, whose inherent meaning is
manliness, in other words, the perfect evolution by the human being
of the inborn qualities and powers native to his humanity.
Another thing I
would like to avoid is the assumption that there is
somewhere and somehow an ideal morality, which draws an absolute and
a sharp distinction between good and evil. Thus it is easy to
say that chastity is good, licence is evil. But what if someone were to
protest that this is a mistake, that chastity is bad, licence is
good. How are you going to refute him? If you appeal to
authority, he will deny that your authority is valid; if you quote
religion, he will remind you that your religion is one of a multitude; if
you talk of natural perception, he will retort that natural
perception cancels itself by arriving at opposite results. How will you
unseat him from his position?
Wilson —
Yes, you can show that good is profitable, while evil is hurtful.
Keshav — You mean the
appeal to utility?
Wilson — Yes.
Keshav — That is
without doubt an advance. Now can you show that good
is profitable, that is to say, has good effects, while evil is
hurtful, that is to say, has bad effects?
Wilson — Easily. Take
your instance of chastity and licence. One is the
ground-work of that confidence which is the basis of marriage and
therefore the keystone of society; the other kills confidence and
infects the community with a bad example.
Keshav — You fly too
fast for me, Broome. You say chastity is the basis of
marriage?
Wilson — Surely you
will not deny it?
Keshav —
And licence in one leads to prevalent unchastity?
Wilson — It has that
tendency.
Keshav —
And you think you have proved chastity to be profitable and
licence hurtful?
Page – 19
Wilson —
Keshav —
No, my friend; for I have not convinced myself that marriage is
a good effect and prevalent unchastity a bad effect.
Wilson — Only paradox
can throw any doubt on that. Assuredly you will
not deny that without marriage and public decency, society
is unimaginable?
Keshav — I
suppose you will allow that in Roman society under the
Emperors marriage was extant? And yet will you tell me that in those
ages chastity was the basis of marriage?
Wilson — I should say
that marriage in the real sense of the word was not
extant.
Keshav — Then what
becomes of your postulate that without marriage and
public decency society is unimaginable?
Wilson — Can you
bestow the name on the world of Nero & Caracalla?
Keshav — Certainly, if
I understand the significance of the word. Wherever
the mutual dependence of men builds up a community
cemented by a chain of rights and liabilities, that, I imagine, is a
society.
Wilson — Certainly,
that is a society.
Keshav —
And will you then hesitate to concede the name to imperial
Italy?
Wilson —
Yes, but you will not deny that from the unreality of marriage and
the impudent disregard of common decency, — at once its
cause and effect — there grew up a prevalence of moral
corruption, but for which the Roman world would not have
succumbed with such nerveless ease to Scythia and its populous
multitude.
Keshav —
What then? I do not deny it.
Wilson — Was not that
a bad effect?
Keshav — By
bad, I presume you mean undesirable?
Wilson — That of
course.
Keshav —
Perhaps it was, but should we not say that Rome fell because
barbarism was strong not because she was feeble?
Wilson —
Rome uncorrupted was able to laugh at similar perils.
Page – 20
Keshav — Then to have
Rome safe, you would have had her remain
barbarous?
Wilson — Did I say so?
Keshav — You implied
it. In Rome the triumphal chariot of Corruption was
drawn by the winged horses, Culture and Art. And it is always
so. From the evergreen foliage of the Periclean era there
bloomed that gorgeous and overblown flower, Athens of the
philosophers, a corrupt luxurious city, the easy vassal of Macedon, the
easier slave of Rome. From the blending of Hellenic with
Persian culture was derived that Oriental pomp and lavish
magnificence which ruined the kingdoms of the East. And Rome, their
conqueror, she too when the Roman in her died and the Italian
lived, when the city of wolves became the abode of men, bartered
her savage prosperity for a splendid decline. Yes, the fullness
of the flower is the sure prelude of decay.
Look at the
India of Vikramaditya. How gorgeous was her
beauty! how Olympian the
voices of her poets! how sensuous the pencil of her painters! how languidly
voluptuous the outlines of her
sculpture! In those days every man was marvellous to himself and
many were marvellous to their fellows; but the mightiest marvel
of all were the philosophers. What a Philosophy was that!
For she scaled the empyrean on the winged sandals of
meditation, soared above the wide fires of the sun and above the
whirling stars, up where the flaming walls of the universe are
guiltless of wind or cloud, and there in the burning core of
existence saw the face of the most high God. She saw God and
did not perish; rather fell back to earth, not blasted with
excess of light, but with a mystic burden on her murmuring lips
too large for human speech to utter or for the human brain
to understand. Such was she then. Yet five rolling
centuries had not passed when sleepless, all-beholding Surya saw the
sons of Mahomet pour like locusts over the green fields of her
glory and the wrecks of that mighty fabric whirling down the rapids
of barbarism into the shores of night. They were barbarous,
therefore mighty: we were civilized, therefore feeble.
Wilson — But was not
your civilization premature? The
Page – 21
building too
hastily raised disintegrates and collapses, for it has the seeds of
death in its origin. May not the utilitarian justly
condemn it as
evil?
Keshav — What the utilitarian may not justly do, it is beyond the limits
of my intellect to discover. Had it not been for these premature
civilizations, had it not been for the Athens of Plato, the Rome
of the Caesars, the India of Vikramaditya, what would the world
be now? It was premature, because barbarism was yet
predominant in the world; and it is wholly due to our premature
efflorescence that your utilitarians can mount the high stool of
folly and defile the memory of the great. When I remember that, I
do not think I can deny that we were premature. I trust and
believe that the civilization of the future will not come too late rather
than too early. No, the utilitarian with his sordid creed may exalt
the barbarian and spit his livid contempt upon culture, but the
great heart of the world will ever beat more responsive to
the flame-winged words of the genius than to the musty musings of
the moralists. It is better to be great and perish, than to be
little and live. But where was I when the wind of tirade carried me out
of my course?
Wilson —
You were breaching the defences of utilitarian morality.
Keshav — Ah, I remember. What I mean is this; the utilitarian arrives
at his results by an arbitrary application of the epithets "good"
and "bad".1
This mistake is of perpetual occurrence in Bentham
and gives the basis for the most monstrous and shocking of his
theories. For example the servitude of women is justified by
the impossibility of marriage without it. Again he condemns theft
by a starving man as a heinous offence because it is likely to
disturb security. He quite forgets to convince us, as the author of
a system professedly grounded on logic should
1 The
following passage was written at the top of the manuscript page. Its place of
insertion was not marked:
When we say a
fruit is wholesome or unwholesome, we mean that it is harmless & nutritious food
or that it tends to dysentery & colic, but when we say that anything is good or bad,
we apply the epithets like tickets without inquiring what we mean by them; we have no
moral touchstone that tells gold from spurious metal.
Page – 22
have done, that
the survival of marriage is a desirable effect or property more
valuable than life.
Wilson — I confess
that Bentham on those two subjects is far too cavalier
and offhand to please me, but the utilitarian system can stand
on another basis than Bentham supplies.
Keshav —
Yours is a curious position, Broome. You are one of those who
would expunge the part of Hamlet from the play that bears his
name. Your religion is Christianity without Christ, your morality
Benthamism without Bentham. Nevertheless my guns are so
pointed that they will breach any wall you choose to set up. For this
is common to all utilitarians that they lose sight of a paramount
consideration: the epithets "good"
and "bad" are purely
conventional and have no absolute sense, but their meaning may be
shifted at the will of the speaker. Indeed they have been the
root of so many revolting ideas and of so many and such
monstrous social tyrannies, that I should not be sorry to see them
expelled from the language, as unfit to be in the company of
decent words. Why do you smile?
Wilson — The novelty
of the idea amused me.
Keshav —
Yes, I know that "original"
and "fool" are synonymous in the
world's vocabulary.
Wilson —
That was a nasty one for me. However I am afraid I shall be
compelled to agree with you.
Keshav — Do you admit that there is only one alternative, faith
without reason or the recognition of morality as a conventional
term without any absolute meaning?
Wilson — I should
rather say that morality is the idea of what is just and
right in vogue among a given number of people.
Keshav — You have
exactly described it. Are you content to take this as
your touchstone?
Wilson — Neither this,
nor faith without reason.
Keshav —
Two positions abandoned at a blow? That is more than I had
the right to expect. Now, as the time is slipping by, let us set
out on the discovery of some law, or should I not rather say, some
indicating tendency by which we may arrive at a principle of
life?
Wilson — I am anxious
to hear it.
Page – 23
Keshav — Let us
furnish ourselves with another glass of claret for the
voyage. You will have some?
Wilson — Thanks.
Keshav — My first
difficulty when I set out on a voyage of discovery is to
select the most probable route. I look at my chart and I see one
marked justice along which the trade winds blow; but whoever has
weighed anchor on this path has arrived like Columbus at
another than the intended destination, without making half so
valuable a discovery. Another route is called "beauty" and
along this no-one has yet sailed. An Irish navigator has indeed
attempted it and made some remarkable discoveries, but he has
clothed his account in such iridescent wit and humour, that our good
serious English audience either grin foolishly at him from a vague
idea that they ought to feel amused or else shake their
heads and grumble that the fellow is corrupting the youth and
ruining their good old Saxon gravity; why he actually makes
people laugh at the beliefs they have been taught by their
venerable and aged grandmothers. But as for believing his traveller's
tales — they believe them not a whit. Possibly if we who do not
possess this dangerous gift of humour, were to follow the path
called beauty, we might hit the target of our desires: if not
we might at least discover things wonderful and new to repay us
for our labour. And so on with other possible routes. Now
which shall we choose? for much hangs on our selection. Shall
we say justice?
Wilson —
Let me know first what justice is.
Keshav — I do not
know, but I think no-one would hesitate to describe it
as forbearance from interfering with the rights of others.
Wilson — That is a
good description.
Keshav — Possibly, but
so long as we do not know what are the rights of
others, the description, however good, can have no meaning.
Wilson — Can we not discover, what are the rights of others?
Keshav — We have been
trying for the last three-thousand years; with how
much or how little success, I do not like to say.
Page – 24
Wilson — Then let us
try another tack.
Keshav —
Can you tell me which one we should choose? My own idea is
that the word "beauty"
is replete with hopeful possibilities.
Wilson — Is not that
because it is used in a hundred different senses?
Keshav — I own that
the word, as used today, is like so many others a
relative term. But if we were to fix a permanent and absolute
meaning on it, should we not say that beauty is that which fills
us with a sense of satisfying pleasure and perfect fitness?
Wilson — Yes, I think
beauty must certainly be judged by its effects.
Keshav — But are there
not minds so moulded that they are dead to all
beauty and find more charm in the showy and vulgar than in what is
genuinely perfect and symmetrical?
Wilson — There can be
no doubt of that.
Keshav —
Then beauty still remains a relative term?
Wilson — Yes.
Keshav — That is
unfortunate. Let us try and find some other test for
it. And in order to arrive at this, should we not take something
recognized by all to be beautiful and examine in what its beauty
lies?
Wilson —
That is distinctly our best course. Let us take the commonest type
of beauty, a rose.
Keshav —
Then in what lies the beauty of a rose if not in its symmetry?
Why has the whole effect that satisfying completeness which
subjugates the senses, if not because Nature has blended in harmonious
proportion the three elements of beauty; colour, perfume, and form? Now beauty
may exist separately in any
two of these elements and where it does so, the accession of
the third would probably mar the perfection of that species
of beauty; as in sculpture where form in its separate
existence finds a complete expression and is blended harmoniously
with perfume — for character or emotion is the perfume of the
human form; just as sound is the perfume of poetry and music
— but if a sculptor tints his statue, the effect
Page – 25
displeases us,
because it seems gaudy or tinsel, or in plain words
disproportionate.
In some cases
beauty seems to have only one of these elements, for example frankincense and
music which seem to possess perfume
only, but in reality we shall find that they have each one or both of
the other elements. For incense would not be half so beautiful, if
we did not see the curling folds of smoke floating like loose
drapery in the air, nor would music be music if not harmoniously
blended with form and colour, or as we usually call them,
technique and meaning. Again there are other cases in which beauty
undoubtedly has one only of the three elements: and such are
certain scents like myrrh, eucalyptus and others, which possess
neither colour nor form, isolated hues such as the green and purple
and violet painted on floor and walls by the afternoon sun
and architectural designs which have no beauty but the isolated
beauty of form.
The criticism of
ages has shown a fit appreciation of these harmonies by
adjudging the highest scale of beauty to those forms which
blend the three elements and the lowest to those which boast only
of one. Thus sculpture is a far nobler art than architecture,
for while both may compass an equal perfection of form,
sculpture alone possesses the larger harmony derived by the union of
form and perfume. Similarly the human form is more divine
than sculpture because it has the third element, colour; and the
painting of figures is more beautiful than the portrayal of
landscapes, because the latter is destitute of perfume, while figures of
life have always that character or emotion which we have called
the perfume of the living form.
Again if we take
two forms of beauty otherwise exactly on the same level,
we shall find that the more beautiful in which the three elements
are more harmoniously blended. As for instance a perfect human
form and a perfect poem; whichever we may admire, we shall
find our reason, if we probe for it, to be that the whole is more
perfectly blended and the result a more satisfying completeness. If we think of
all this, it will assuredly not be too rash to describe beauty
by calling the general effect harmony and the
Page – 26
ulterior cause
proportion. What is your opinion, Broome?
Wilson —
Your idea is certainly remarkable and novel, but the language you
have selected is so intricate that I am in the dark as to
whether it admits of invariable application.
Keshav — The usual
effect of endeavouring to be too explicit is to
mystify the hearer. I will try to dive into less abysmal depths. Can you
tell me, why a curve is considered more beautiful than a
straight line?
Wilson — No, except
that the effect is more pleasing.
Keshav — Ah
yes, but why should it be more pleasing?
Wilson — I cannot
tell.
Keshav — I
will tell you. It is because a curve possesses that variety which is
the soul of proportion. It rises, swells and falls with an exact
propriety — it is at once various and regular as rolling water;
while the stiff monotony of a straight line disgusts the soul by its
meaningless rigidity and want of proportion. On the other hand a
system of similar curves, unless very delicately managed, cannot
possibly suggest the idea of beauty: and that is because there is
no proportion, for proportion, I would impress on you, consists
in a regular variety. And thus a straight line, tho' in itself
ugly, can be very beautiful if properly combined with curves.
Here again the like principle applies.
Do you now
understand?
Wilson — Yes, I admit that your theory is wonderfully complete and
consistent.
Keshav — If
you want a farther illustration, I will give you one. And just as
before we selected the most commonly received type of beauty,
I will now select the most perfect: and that, I think, is a
perfect poem. Would you not agree with me?
Wilson —
No, I should give the palm to a perfectly beautiful face.
Keshav — I think you
are wrong.
Wilson — Have you any
reason for thinking so?
Keshav —
Yes, and to me a very satisfying reason. The three elements of
beauty do not blend with absolutely perfect harmony in a human face.
Have you not frequently noticed that those faces which
express the most soul, the most genius, the most
Page – 27
character, are
not perfectly harmonious in their form?
Wilson —
Yes, the exceptions are rare.
Keshav — And the
reason is that to emphasize the character, the divine
artist has found himself compelled to emphasize certain of the
features above the others, for instance, the lips, the eyes, the
forehead, the chin, and to give them an undue prominence which
destroys that proportion without which there can be no
perfect harmony. Do you perceive my meaning?
Wilson — Yes, and I do
not think your conclusions can be disputed.
Keshav — In a
perfectly beautiful face the emotion has to be modified and
discouraged, so as not to disturb the harmony of form: but in
a perfectly beautiful poem the maker has indeed to blend with
exquisite nicety the three elements of beauty, but though the
colour may be gorgeous, the emotion piercingly vivid, the form
deliriously lovely, yet each of these has so just a share of the effect, that
we should find it difficult to add to or to detract from any one of
them without fatally injuring the perfection of the whole.
And so it is
with every form of beauty that is not originally
imperfect; to
detract or add would be alike fatal; for alteration means abolition.
Each syllable is a key-stone and being removed, the whole
imposing structure crumbles in a moment to the ground.
Can we better
describe this perfect blending of parts than by the word
proportion? or is its entire effect anything but
harmony?
Wilson — There are
indeed no better words.
Keshav — And this
harmony runs through the warp and woof of Nature.
Look at the stars, the brain of heaven, as Meredith calls
them. How they march tossing on high their golden censers
to perfume night with the frankincense of beauty! They are a host
of winged insects crawling on the blue papyrus
of heaven, a
swarm of golden gnats, a cloud of burning dust, a wonderful
effect of sparkling atoms caught and perpetuated by the
instantaneous pencil of Nature. And yet they are none of all these,
but a vast and interdependent economy of worlds.
Page – 28
Those burning
globes as they roll in silent orbits through the infinite inane,
are separated by an eternity of space. They are
Well may the
poet give the stars that majestic synonym
The army of
unalterable law.
But the law that
governs the perishable flower, the ephemeral moth, is not
more changeful than the law that disciplines the
movements of the
eternal fires. The rose burns in her season; the moth lives
in his hour: not even the wind bloweth where it listeth unless
it preserve the boundaries prescribed by Nature. Each is a
separate syllable in the grand poem of the universe: and it is all so
inalterable because it is so perfect. Yes, Tennyson was right, tho'
like most poets, he knew not what he said, when he wrote those
lines on the flower in the crannies: if we know what the flower
is, we know also what God is and what man.
Wilson — I begin to
catch a glimpse of your drift. But is there no
discordant element in this universal harmony?
Page – 29
Keshav — There is. As
soon as we come to life, we find that God's
imagination is no longer unerring; we almost think that he has
reached a conception which it is beyond his power to execute. It
is true that there are grand and beautiful lines in the vast epic
of life, but others there are so unmusical and discordant that
we can scarcely believe but that Chance was the author of
existence. The beautiful lines are no doubt wonderful; among the
insects the peacock-winged butterfly, the light spendthrift of
unclouded hours; the angry wasp, that striped and perilous
tiger of the air; the slow murmuring bee, an artist in honey and
with the true artist's indolence outside his art: and then the
birds — the tawny eagle shouting his clangorous aspiration
against the sun; the cruel shrike, his talons painted in murder; the
murmuring dove robed in the pure and delicate hue of
constancy: the inspired skylark with his matin-song descending like a
rain of fire from the blushing bosom of the dawn. Nay the beasts
too are not without their fine individualities: the fire-eyed lion, the creeping
panther, the shy fawn, the majestic elephant;
each fill a line of the great poem and by contrast enhance harmony.
But what shall
we say of the imaginations that inspire nothing but disgust,
the grub, the jackal, the vulture? And when
we come to man,
we are half inclined to throw up our theory in despair. For
we only see a hideous dissonance, a creaking melody, a
ghastly failure. We see the philosopher wearing a crown of thorns
and the fool robed in purple and fine linen: the artist
drudging at a desk and the average driving his quill thro' reams of
innocent paper: we see genius thrust aside into the hedges and
stupidity driving her triumphal chariot on the beaten paths of social
existence. Once we might have said that nature like a novice in art was
rising through failures and imperfections into an artistic consummation and that
when Evolution had exhausted her
energies, her eyes would gaze on a perfect universe. But when we come
to the human being, her most ambitious essay, the
cynicism of frustrated hope steals slowly over us. I am reminded of some
lines in a sonnet more remarkable for power than for
felicitous expression.
Page – 30
She crowned her
wild work with one foulest wrong
When first she
lighted on a seeming goal
And darkly
blundered on man's suffering soul.
It is as if
nature in admitting action into her universe were in
the position of
a poet who trusted blindly to inspiration without subjecting his
work to the instincts of art or the admonitions of the critical
faculty; but once dissatisfied with his work begins to pass his pen
repeatedly thro' his after performances, until he seems at last
to have lighted on a perfect inspiration. His greatest essay
completed he suddenly discovers that one touch of realism
running thro' the whole work has fatally injured its beauty.
Similarly Nature in moulding man, made a mistake of the first
importance. She gave him the faculty of reason and by the use of her
gift he has stultified the beauty of her splendid imaginations.
Tennyson, by one
of his felicitous blunders, has again hit
upon the truth
when he conceives the solemn wail of a heaven-born spirit in
the agony of his disillusioning.
I saw him in the
shining of his stars,
I marked him in
the flowering of his fields,
But in his ways
with men I found him not.
How true is
every syllable! God burns in the star, God blossoms
in the rose: the
cloud is the rushing dust of his chariot, the sea is the spuming
mirror of his moods. His breath whistles in the wind, his
passion reddens in the sunset, his anguish drops in the rain. The
darkness is the soft fall of his eyelashes over the purple magnificence of
his eyes: the sanguine dawn is his flushed and happy face as he
leaves the flowery pillow of sleep; the moonlight is nothing but
the slumberous glint of his burning tresses when thro' them
glimmer the heaving breasts of Eternity. What to him are the petty
imaginings of human aspiration; our puny frets, our pitiable
furies, our melodramatic passions? If he deigns to think of us, it
is as incompetent actors who have wholly misunderstood the
bent of our powers. The comedian rants in the vein of Bombastes;
the tragic artist plays the buffoon in the pauses of
Page – 31
a pantomime, and
the genius that might have limned the passion of a Romeo,
moulds the lumpish ineptitude of a Cloten. God
Wilson — And are these
the ultimate syllables of Philosophy?
Keshav — You are
impatient, Broome. What I have arrived at is the
discovery that human life is, if not the only, at any rate the
principal note in Nature that jars with the grand idea underlying her
harmony. Do you agree with me?
Wilson — He would be a
hopeless optimist who did not.
Keshav —
And are you of the opinion that it is the exercise by man of his
will-power to which we owe the discord?
Wilson —
No, I would throw the blame on Nature.
Keshav — After the
example of Adam? "The woman tempted me and I
did eat." I too am a son of Adam and would throw the blame
on Nature. But once her fault is admitted, has not the human
will been manifestly her accomplice?
Wilson — Her
instrument rather.
Keshav —
Very well, her instrument. You admit that?
Wilson — Yes.
Keshav — Then if the
human will, prompted by Nature or her servant,
False Reason, has marred the universal harmony, may not the
human will, prompted by Right Reason who is also the servant of
Nature, mend the harmony he has marred? Or if that puzzles
you, let me put the question in another form. Does not a wilful
choice of sensuality imply an alternative of purity?
Wilson — It
does.
Keshav — And a wilful
choice of unbelief an alternative of belief?
Wilson — Yes.
Keshav — Then on the
same principle, if the human will chose to mar the
harmony of nature, was it not within its power to choose the
opposite course and fulfil the harmony?
Wilson — Certainly
that follows.
Page – 32
Keshav — And through
ignorance and the promptings of False Reason we
preferred to spoil rather than to fulfil?
Wilson — Yes.
Keshav — And we can
mend what we mar?
Wilson — Sometimes.
Keshav — Well then, can we not choose to mend the harmony we
originally chose to mar?
Wilson — I
do not think it probable.
Keshav — An admission
that it is possible, is all I want to elicit from you.
Wilson — I do not know
that.
Keshav —
Have not some episodes of the great epic rung more in unison
with the grand harmony than others?
Wilson —
Yes; the old-world Greeks were more in tune with the Universe
than we.
Keshav —
The name of the episode does not signify. You admit a race or
an epoch which has fallen into the harmony more than
others?
Wilson — Freely.
Keshav — Then as you
admit the more and the less, will you not admit that the
more may become in its turn the less — that there may
be the yet more? May we not attain to a more perfect harmony
with the universe than those who have been most in harmony
with it?
Wilson — It is
possible.
Keshav — If
it is possible, should we not go on and inquire how it is
possible?
Wilson —
That is the next step.
Keshav — And when we
have found an answer to our inquiries, shall
we not have solved this difficult question of a new basis for
morality?
Wilson —
Yes, we shall: for I see now that to be in harmony with beauty, or,
in other words, to take the guiding principle of the universe as
the guiding principle of human life, is the final and perfect aim
of the human species.
Keshav —
Broome, you have the scent of a sleuth-hound.
Wilson — I am afraid
that is ironical. You must remember
Page – 33
that we are not
all philosophers yet. Still I should have liked to see how the idea
came out in practice.
Keshav — If you can
spare me another night or it may be two, we will
pursue the idea through its evolutions. I am deeply interested, for
to me as to you it is perfectly novel.
Wilson —
Shall you be free on Thursday night?
Keshav — As free as
the wind.
Wilson —
Then I will come. Goodnight.
Keshav — Goodnight,
and God reward you for giving me your company.
————
End of the Book First
Keshav Ganesh [Desai] — Trevor — Broome Wilson
Keshav — Ah, Broome, so the magnetism of thought has broken the
chains of duty? May I introduce you? Mr.. Trevor of Kings, Mr.. Broome Wilson of
Jesus. Would you like wine or coffee?
Wilson — Perhaps for an evening of metaphysics wine is the most
appropriate prelude.
Keshav — You agree then with the Scythians who made a point of
deliberating when drunk? They were perhaps right; one is inclined to think that
most men are wiser drunk than sober. I have been endeavouring to explain my line
of argument to Trevor, I am afraid with indifferent success.
Wilson — Can I do anything to help you?
Keshav — I have no doubt you can. Would you mind stating your
difficulty, Trevor? I think you allow that every other basis of morality is
unsound but uphold the utilitarian model as perfectly logical and consistent.
Trevor — Yes, that is what I hold to, and I do not think, Desai,
you have at all shaken its validity.
Keshav — You do not admit that the epithets "good" and "bad"
have a purely conventional force.
Trevor — Yes, I admit that, but I add that we have fixed a
definite meaning on the epithets and adhered to it all through our system.
Keshav — If so, you are fortunate. Can you tell me the definite
meaning to which you refer?
Trevor — The basis of our system is this, that whatever is
profitable, is good, whatever is the reverse, is evil. Is not that an
unassailable basis?
Keshav — I do not think so; for two ambiguous words you have
merely substituted two others only less ambiguous.
Page – 35
Trevor — I fail to see your reasoning.
Keshav — I will endeavour to show you what I mean. You will
admit that one man's meat is another man's poison, will you not?
Trevor — Yes, and that is where our system works so beautifully;
for we bring in our arithmetical solution of balancing the good and the evil of
an action and if the scale of the evil rises, we stamp it as good, if the scale
of the good rises, we brand it as evil. What do you say to that?
Keshav — Dear me! that does indeed sound simple and satisfying.
I am afraid, Broome, we shall have to throw up our theory in favour of
Bentham's. Your system is really so attractive and transparent, Trevor, that I
should dearly like to learn more about it.
Trevor — Now you are indulging in irony, Desai; you know Bentham
as well as I do.
Keshav — Not quite so well as all that; but I avow I have
studied him very carefully. Yet from some cause I have not discovered, his
arguments seldom seemed to me to have any force, while you on the other hand do
really strike home to the judgment. And therefore I should like to see whether
you are entirely at one with Bentham. For example I believe you prefer the good
of the community to the good of the individual, do you not?
Trevor — Not at all: it is the individuals who are the
community.
Keshav — It is gratifying to learn that: but if the interests of
a few individuals conflict with the interests of the general body, you prefer
the interests of the general body, do you not?
Trevor — As a matter of course.
Keshav — And, as a general rule, if you have to deal with a
number of persons and the good of some is not reconcilable with the good of
others, you prefer the good of the greater number?
Trevor — That again is obvious.
Keshav — So you accept the dogma "the greatest good of the
greatest number", for if one interest of a given person or number of persons
conflict with another interest, you prefer the greater?
Page – 36
Trevor — Without hesitation.
Keshav — And so the Athenians were right when they put Socrates
to death.
Trevor — What makes you advance so absurd a paradox?
Keshav — Why, your arithmetical system of balancing the good and
the evil. The injury to Socrates is not to be put in comparison with the profit
to the State, for we prefer the good of the greater number, and the pleasure
experienced by the youths he corrupted in his discourse and the enjoyment of
their corruption is not to be so much considered as the pain they would
experience from the effects of their corruption and the pain inflicted on the
state by the rising generation growing up corrupt and dissolute, for among
conflicting interests we prefer the greatest.
Trevor — But Socrates did not corrupt the youth of Athens.
Keshav — The Athenians thought he was corrupting their youth and
they were bound to act on their opinion.
Trevor — They were not bound to act on their opinion, but on the
facts.
Keshav — What is this you are telling me, Trevor? We are then
only to act when we have a correct opinion, and, seeing that a definitely
correct opinion can only be formed by posterity after we are dead, we are not to
use your arithmetical balance or at least can only use it when we are dead? Then
I do not see much utility in your arithmetical balance.
Trevor — Now I come to think of it, the Athenians were right in
putting Socrates to death.
Keshav — And the Jews in crucifying Christ?
Trevor — Yes.
Keshav — I admire your fortitude, my dear Trevor. And if the
English people had thought Bentham was corrupting their youth, they would have
been right in hanging Bentham, would they not?
Trevor — What a fellow you are, Desai! Of course what I mean is
that the Athenians & the Jews did not listen to their honest opinion but purely
to the voice of malice.
Keshav — Then if these wicked people who put wise men to death
not in honest folly but from malice, were to have said
Page – 37
to you, "Come now, you who accuse us of pure malice, are you
not actuated by pure benevolence? If our approval is founded on
Trevor — Yes, and I should tell them that I valued as profitable
what conduces to happiness and as unprofitable what detracts from or does not
add to happiness.
Keshav — I am afraid that would not satisfy them, for the nature
of happiness is just as disputable as the nature of profit. You do not think so?
Well, for example do not some think that happiness lies in material comfort,
while others look for it in the province of the intellect?
Trevor — These distinctions are mere nonsense; both are alike
essential.
Keshav — Indeed we have reason to thank heaven that there are
still some of the sages left who are sufficiently impartial to condemn every
opinion but their own. Yet under correction, I should like to venture on a
question; if the good that conduces to material comfort is not reconcilable with
the good that conduces to intellectual pleasure, how do you manage your
arithmetical balance?
Trevor — Material comfort before all things! that is a
necessity, intellect a luxury.
Keshav — You are a consistent change-artist, Trevor; yet may
there not be diverse opinions on the point?
Trevor — I do not see how it is possible. The human race may be
happy without intellectual pleasure, but never without material comfort.
Keshav — Have you any historical data to bear out your
generalisation?
Trevor — I cannot say I have, but I appeal to common sense.
Page – 38
Keshav — Oh, if you appeal to Caesar, I am lost; but be sure
that if you bring your case before the tribunal of common sense, I will appeal
not to common, but to uncommon sense — and that will arbitrate in my favour.
Trevor — Well, we must agree to differ.
Keshav — At any rate we have arrived at this, that you assign
material comfort as the most important element in happiness, while I assign the
free play of the intellect.
Trevor — So it seems.
Keshav — And you maintain that I am wrong because I disagree
with you?
Trevor — No, because you disagree with reason.
Keshav — That is, with reason as you see it.
Trevor — If you like.
Keshav — And you think I am unique in my opinion?
Trevor — No indeed! there are too many who agree with you.
Keshav — Now we have gone a step farther. Apparently the nature
of happiness is a matter of opinion.
Trevor — Oh, of course, if you like to say so.
Keshav — And happiness is the basis of morality. You agree? Very
well, the nature of the basis is a matter of opinion, and it seems to follow
that morality itself is a matter of opinion. And so we have come to this, that
after rejecting as a basis of morality our individual sense of what is just and
right, we have accepted our individual sense of what conduces to happiness.
Therefore it is moral for you to refrain from stealing and for me to steal.
Trevor — That is a comfortable conclusion at any rate.
Keshav — Yet I think it is borne out by our premises. Do you not
imagine the security of property to be essential to happiness and anything that
disturbs it immoral?
Trevor — That goes without saying and I admit that it is immoral
for me to steal.
Keshav — Now I on the other hand am indeed of the opinion that
material comfort is essential to happiness, for without it the intellect cannot
have free play, but believing as I do that
Page – 39
the system of private property conduces to the comfort of the
few, but its abolition will conduce to the comfort of the many,
Trevor — There is no arguing with you, Desai. You wrest the
meaning of words until one does not remember what one is talking about. The
enormous length to which you carry your sophistries is appalling. If I had time,
I would stop and refute you. As it is, I will leave you to pour your absurdities
into more congenial ears.
Keshav — You are not going, Trevor?
Trevor — I am afraid I must. Goodnight.
Keshav — Goodnight.
That was rather brisker towards the close. I hope you were
not bored, Broome.
Wilson — No, I was excellently amused. But do your arguments
with him usually terminate in this abrupt fashion?
Keshav — Very often they do so terminate. Trevor is a good
fellow — a fine intellect spoiled — but he cannot bear adversity with an equal
mind. Now let us resume our inquiry.
I think we had gone so far as to discover that human life is
the great element of discord in the Cosmos, and the best system of morality is
that which really tends to restore the harmony of the universe, and we agreed
that if we apply the principles governing the universe to human life, we shall
discover the highest principle of conduct. That was the point where we broke
off, was it not?
Wilson — Yes, we broke off just there.
Keshav — So we profess to have found a sense in which the theory
advanced by philosophers of every age has become true, that life ought to be
lived in accordance with nature and not in
Page – 40
accordance with convention. The error we impute to them was
that they failed to keep nature distinct from human nature and
Wilson — That is a subtle distinction.
Keshav — Not at all. Civilization was necessary, if the human
race was to progress at all. The pity of it is that it has taken the wrong turn
and fallen into the waters of convention. There lies the failure. When man at
the very first step of his history used his reason to confound the all-pervading
Cosmos or harmonious arrangement of Nature, conventions became necessary in
order to allure him into less faulty modes of reasoning, by which alone he could
learn to rectify his error. But after the torrent had rolled for a time along
its natural course and two broad rivers of Thought, the Greek and the Hindu,
were losing themselves in the grand harmony, there was a gradual but perceptible
swerve, and the forces of convention which had guided, began to misguide, and
the Sophists in Greece, in India the Brahmans availed themselves of these mighty
forces to compass their own supremacy, and once at the helm of thought gave
permanence to the power by which they stood, until two religions, the most
hostile to Nature, in the east Buddhism, her step-child Christianity in the
west, completed the evil their predecessors had begun.
Hear the legend of Purush, the son of Prithivi, and his
journey to the land of Beulah, the land of blooming gardens and yellow-vested
acres and wavering tree-tops, and two roads lead to it. One road is very simple,
very brief, very direct, and this leads over the smiling summit of a
double-headed peak, but the other through the gaping abysses of a lion-throated
antre and
Page – 41
it is very long, very painful, very circuitous. Now the wise
and beautiful instructress of Purush had indeed warned him that
Very gaily he entered the cave singing wild ballads of the
deeds his fathers wrought, of Krishna and Arjun and Ram and Ravan and their
glory and their fall, but not so merrily did he journey in its entrails, but
rather in hunger and thirst groped wearily with the unsleeping beak of the
vulture Misery in his heart, and only now and then caught glimpses of an elusive
light, yet did not realise his error but pursued with querulous reproaches the
beautiful gods his happy imagination had moulded or bitterly reviled the
double-dealing he imputed to his lovely and wise instructress — "for she it was"
he complained "who told me of the route through the cavern". None the less he
persevered until he was warmed by the genuine smiles of daylight and joy
blossoming in his heart, made his step firmer and his body more erect.
And he strode on until he arrived where the antre split in
two branches, the one seeming dark as Erebus to his eyes, though indeed it was
white and glorious as a naked girl and suffused by the light of the upper heaven
with seas of billowing splendour, had not his eyes, grown dim from holding
communion with the night and blinded by the unaccustomed brilliance, believed
that the light was darkness, through which if he had persevered, he had arrived
in brief space among the blooming gardens and the wavering tree-tops and the
acres in their glorious golden garb and all the imperishable beauty of Beulah.
And the other branch
Page – 20
he thought the avenue of the sunlight, because the glimmer
was feeble enough to be visible, like a white arm through a sleeve of
Page – 43
his weariness, and so pursue his journey by the nearest way
to the wavering tree-tops, and the blooming gardens and the acres
This is the legend of Purush, the son of Prithivi and his
journey to the land of Beulah.
Wilson — That is a fine apologue, Keshav; is it your own, may I
ask?
Keshav — It is an allegory conceived by Vallabha Swami, the
Indian Epicurus, and revealed to me by him in a vision.
Wilson — There we see the false economy of Nature; only they are
privileged to see these beautiful visions, who can without any prompting
conceive images not a whit less beautiful.
Keshav — The germ of the story was really a dream, but the form
and application are my own. The myth means, as I dare say you have found out,
that our present servitude to conventions which are the machinery of thought and
action, is principally due to weaknesses forming a large element in human
nature. Our lives ought not to be lived in accordance with human nature which
can nowhere be found apart from the disturbing element of reason, but according
to nature at large where we find the principle of harmony pure and undefiled.
Wilson — On that we are both at one; let us start directly from
this base of operations. I am impatient to follow the crocus moon with her
triple zone of burning stars into the Eden of murmuring brooks and golden groves
and fields of asphodel.
Keshav — The basis of morality is then the application to human
life of the principles governing the universe; and the great principle of the
universe is beauty, is it not?
Wilson — So we have discovered.
Keshav — And we described beauty as harmony in effect and
proportion in detail.
Wilson — That was our description.
Keshav — Then the aim of morality must be to make human life
harmonious. Now the other types in the universe are harmonious not merely in
relation to their internal parts, but in relation to each other and the sum of
the universe, are they not?
Page – 44
Wilson —Yes.
Keshav —We mean, I suppose, that the star fills its place in the
Cosmos and the rose fills her place, but man does not fill his.
Wilson —That is what we mean.
Keshav —Then the human race must not only be harmonious within
itself, but must be harmonious in relation to the star and the rose and so fill
its place as to perfect the harmony of the universe.
Wilson —Are we not repeating ourselves?
Keshav —No, but we are in danger of it. I am aiming at a clear
and accurate wording of my position and that is not easy to acquire at a
moment's notice. I think our best way would be to consider the harmony of man
with the universe and leave the internal harmony of the race for subsequent
inquiry.
Wilson —Perhaps it would be best.
Keshav —When we say that man should fill his place in the
Cosmos, we mean that he should be in proportion with its other elements, just as
the thorn is in proportion to the leaf and the leaf to the rose, for proportion
is the ulterior cause of harmony. And we described proportion as a regular
variety, or to use a more vivid phrase, a method in madness. If this is so, it
is incumbent on man to be various in his development from the star, the rose and
the other elements of the Cosmos, in a word to be original.
Wilson —That follows.
Keshav —But is it enough to be merely original? For in stance if
he were to hoist himself into the air by some mechanical contrivance and turn
somersaults unto all eternity, that would be original, but he would not be
helping much towards universal harmony, would he?
Wilson —Well, not altogether.
Keshav —Then if we want to describe the abstract idea of virtue,
we want something more than originality. I think we said that proportion is not
merely variety, but regular variety?
Wilson —Yes, that is obvious.
Keshav —Then man must be not merely original but regular in his
originality.
Wilson —I cannot exactly see what you mean.
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Keshav —I cannot at all see what I mean; yet, unless our whole
theory is unsound, and that I am loth to believe, I must mean something. Let us
try the plan we have already adopted with such success, when we discovered the
nature of beauty. We will take some form of harmony and inquire how regularity
enters into it; and it occurs to me that the art of calligraphy will be useful
for the purpose, for a beautifully-written sentence has many letters just as the
universe has many types and it seems that proportion is just as necessary to it.
Wilson —Yes, calligraphy will do very well.
Keshav —I recollect that we supposed beauty to have three
elements, of which every type must possess at least one, better two, and as a
counsel of perfection all three. If we inquire, we shall find that form is
absolutely imperative, seeing that if the form of the letters is not beautiful
or the arrangement of the lines not harmonious, then the sentence is not
beautifully written. Colour too may be an element of calligraphy, for we all
know what different effects we can produce by using inks of various colours. And
if the art is to be perfect, I think that perfume will have to enter very
largely into it. Let us write the word "beautiful". Here you see the letters are
beautifully formed, their arrangement is beautiful, this bright green ink I am
using harmonizes well with the word, and moreover the sight of this peculiar
combination of letters written in this peculiar way brings to my mind a peculiar
association of ideas, which I call the perfume of the written word.
Wilson —But is it not the combination, not of letters but of
sounds, which lingers in your mind and calls up the idea?
Keshav —I do not think so, for I often find sentences that seem
to me beautiful in writing or in print, but, once I utter them aloud, become
harsh and unmusical; and sometimes the reverse happens, especially in Meredith,
in whom I have often at first sight condemned a sentence as harsh and ugly,
which, when I read it aloud, I was surprised to find apt and harmonious. From
this I infer that if a writer's works appear beautiful in print or manuscript,
but not beautiful when read aloud, he may be set down as a good artist in
calligraphy, but a bad artist in literature,
Page – 46
since suggestion to the eye is the perfume of the written, but suggestion
to the ear the perfume of the spoken word.
In this however I seem to have been digressing to no purpose;
Wilson —I do not know at present, but I can see that the variety
is regular.
Keshav —This we must find out without delay. Let us take the
alphabet and see if the secret is patent there.
Wilson —That is indeed looking for Truth at the bottom of a
well.
Keshav —Do you not see at a glance that the letters in the Latin
alphabet are regular in this sense, that the dominant line is the curve and
there is no written letter without it, for the straight lines are only used to
prevent the monotony generated by an unrelieved system of curves? In the Bengali
alphabet again, which is more elaborate, but less perfect than the Latin, there
is a dominant combination of one or more straight lines with one or more curves
and to obviate monotony letters purely composed of straight lines are set off by
others purely composed of curves. In the Burmese and other dialects, I believe
but from hearsay only, no line but the curve is admitted and I am told that the
effect is undeniably pretty but a trifle monotonous. Here then we have a clue.
If we consider, as we have previously considered, every type in the universe to
be a word, then, if the sentence is to be beautifully written each word must not
only be various from its near companions but must allow one dominant principle
to determine the lines on which it must vary; and to avoid monotony there must
be straight lines in the letters, that is to say each type must have individual
types within it departing from the general type by acknowledging another
dominant principle. I am afraid
Page – 47
Wilson —No, I perfectly understand; but I should like to guard
myself against being misled by the analogy between a beautifully-written
sentence and the beautifully-arranged universe. If this rule does not apply to
every other form of beauty, we may not justly compare the universe to one in
which it does happen to apply.
Keshav —I hope you will only require me to adduce examples of
perfect beauty, for the aim of morality is to arrange a perfect, not an
imperfect harmony.
Wilson —Oh certainly, that is all I am entitled to require.
Keshav —Then you will admit that the stars are various, yet
built on a dominant principle?
Wilson —Without doubt.
Keshav —And in making the flowers so various, the divine artist
did not fail to remember a dominant principle which prevails in the structure
and character of his episode in flowers.
Wilson —But this is merely to take an unfair advantage of the
method of species so largely indulged in by Nature.
Keshav
—Well, if you prefer particulars to generals, we will inquire into the beauty of
a Greek design, for the Greeks were the only painters who understood the value
of design, and we will as usual take an example of perfect beauty. Do you know
the Nereid and Sea-Horse?
Wilson —Very intimately.
Keshav —Then, if you have not forgotten how in that in
comparable work of art to every mass there is another and answering mass and to
the limbs floating forward limbs floating backwards and to every wisp of drapery
an answering wisp of drapery, and in short how the whole design is built on the
satisfying principle of balancing like by like, you will admit that here is a
dominant idea regulating variety. And the principle of balancing like with like
is not peculiar to Greek designing but prevalent in the designs of Nature, for
example, the human face, where eye answers to luminous eye and both are luminous
with one and the same brilliance, nor is one hazel while the other is azure, and
the porches of hearing are two but similar in their
Page – 48
curious workmanship, and the sweep of the brow to one ear
does not vary from the sweep of the brow to the other and the divergence of the
chin describes a similar curve on either face
Wilson —Yet I should like to ask one more question.
Keshav —My dear Broome, you are at liberty to ask a thousand,
for I am always ready to answer.
Wilson —A single answer will satisfy me. Why do you compare the
universe to a system of designs and not to a single design?
Keshav —The universe itself is a system of designs, first the
harmony of worlds and within it the lands and seas and on that the life of
flowers and trees & the life of birds and beasts and fishes and the life of
human beings. Imagine the Greeks in search of a dominant idea to regulate the
variety of their designs and hitting on the human figure as their model; would
they not have been foolish, if they had gone away from their study of the human
figure and drawn a system, balancing like design by like design?
Wilson —I suppose they would.
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Keshav —Nor should we be less foolish to draw up an ideal
universe or system of designs on the principle of a single design. Are you
satisfied?
Wilson —Perfectly.
Keshav —And our conclusion is that we ought to regulate the
variety of the types in the universe, not by balancing like with like, but by
determining the lines of variance on one dominant principle.
Wilson —That is the indisputable conclusion.
Keshav —And so, now we have panted up to the ridge we once
thought the crowning summit, we find that we have to climb another slope as
arduous which was lying in wait for us behind. We have discovered the presence
of a dominant idea in the variety of types, but we do not know what the idea may
be.
Wilson —That is what we have to find.
Keshav —But if we find that all the diverging types observe a
single requisite in divergence, shall we not infer that we have found the idea
of which we are inquisitive?
Wilson —Obviously.
Keshav —And we shall find it most easily by comparing one type
with another, shall we not?
Wilson —That is our first idea.
Keshav —But if we compare a rose to a star, we shall not find
them agree in any respect except the brilliance of their hues and that is not
likely to be the dominant idea.
Wilson —They are both beautiful.
Keshav —Exactly, but we wish to learn the elements of their
beauty, and we agreed that these were variety, to begin with, and method in
variety. Now we are inquiring what the method is they observe in their variety.
We know that they are both beautiful; but we wish to know why they are both
beautiful.
Wilson —And how are you going to do it?
Keshav —Well, since it will not do to compare a rose with a
star, we will compare a star with a star; and here we find, that, however widely
they differ, there is a large residuum of properties, such as brilliance and
light, which are invariably present in one and the other, and they diverge not
in the possession
Page – 50
and absence of properties peculiar to a star, but in things ac
Wilson —There can be no doubt of that.
Keshav —Then have we not found the dominant idea which governs
the variety of types?
Wilson — I really believe we have.
Keshav —And man if he wishes to be in proportion with the other
elements of the Cosmos, must be content to develop the virtues of a man without
aspiring to the virtues of a rose or a star, or any other element of the Cosmos?
Wilson —So it seems.
Keshav —And when we talk of the virtues of a star, do we not
mean the inborn qualities and powers which are native to its sidereal character,
for example brilliance and light?
Wilson —Of course.
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Keshav —And by the virtues of a flower the inborn qualities and
powers which are native to its floral character, such as fragrance, colour,
delicacy of texture?
Wilson —Yes.
Keshav —Then by the virtues of a man we shall have to mean the
inborn qualities and powers which are native to his humanity, such as -what
shall we say?
Wilson —That we can discover afterwards.
Keshav —Very well; but at any rate we can see already that some
things are not inborn qualities and powers native to our humanity; and we know
now why it is not an act of splendid virtue to turn somersaults in the air
without any visible means of sup port; for if we did that, we should not be
developing the virtues of a man, but we should be aspiring to the virtues of a
kite; or, to use one of our phrases, we should be mad without method.
Wilson —That is evident.
Keshav —So a man's virtue lies not in turning somersaults
without any visible means of support, but in the perfect evolution of the inborn
qualities and powers which are native to his humanity.
Wilson —Yes, and I believe these are the very words in which you
described virtue before we started on our voyage of discovery.
Keshav —That is indeed gratifying: and if we have shown any
constancy and perseverance in following our clue through the labyrinth, I at
least am amply rewarded, who feel convinced by the identity of the idea I have
derived from the pedestrian processes of logical inference with the idea I once
caught on the wings of thought and instinct, that as far as human eyes are
allowed to gaze on the glorious visage of Truth unveiled, we shall be privileged
to unveil her and embrace her spiritual presence, and are not following a
will-o'-the-wisp of the imagination to perish at last in a quagmire.
We have then laid a firm hold on that clear and accurate
wording, for which we were recently groping as blindly as Purush in his delusive
cavern. And since the human brain is impatient of abstract ideas but easily
fixed and taken by concrete
Page – 52
images, let me embody our ideas in a simile. I have an accurate remembrance
of climbing a very steep and ragged rock on the Yorkshire beaches, where my only
foothold was a ladder carved
Here then we have two rungs of the ladder, we must now be
very careful in our selection of the third.
Wilson —Is it not obviously the next stage to discover what are
the inborn qualities and powers native to our humanity?
Keshav —Possibly. Yet have we not forgotten a signal omission we
made when we drew inferences from the comparison of a beautifully written
sentence to the beautifully arranged universe?
Wilson —I am afraid I at least have forgotten. What was it?
Keshav —Did we not compare the broad types in the Cosmos to the
words in a sentence and infer that as the dominant principle governing the word
was the prevalence of the curve, so there must be a dominant principle governing
the type?
Wilson —We did.
Keshav —And also that as in the letters within the word
Page – 53
there were two prevalent lines, the curve and the straight
line, so within the broad or generic type there are individual types governed by
quite another principle.
Wilson —That also. But surely you are not going to argue from
analogies?
Keshav —Did we not argue from the beautifully written sentence
merely because the principles of calligraphy proved to be the principles of
every sort of harmony?
Wilson —I confess we did; otherwise all we have been saying
would be merely a brilliant explosion of fancy.
Keshav —Then we are logically justified in what we have been
doing. Consider then how in a system of harmony, every part has to be harmonious
in itself or else mar the universal music.
Wilson —That is true.
Keshav —And the human race is a part of such a system, is it
not?
Wilson —Yes.
Keshav —Then must the human race become harmonious within itself
or continue to spoil the universal harmony.
Wilson —Of course. How foolish of me to lose sight of that.
Keshav —And so we have been elucidating the harmony of man with
the Cosmos and saying nothing about the harmony of man with man?
Wilson —Did we not relegate that for subsequent inquiry?
Keshav —We did, but I think the time for subsequent inquiry has
come.
Wilson —It is too late in the day for me to distrust your
guidance.
Keshav —I do not think you will have reason to regret your
confidence in me. Our line then will be to consider the internal harmony of the
race before we proceed farther.
Wilson —So it is best.
Keshav —Here again we must start from our description of beauty
as harmony in effect and proportion in detail and our description of the latter
as a regular variety or method in
Page – 54
madness. Then just as in the Cosmos, the individual type must vary from all
the other types, so in the human Cosmos the individual man must vary from all
other men.
Wilson —That is rather startling. Do you mean that there ought
to be no point of contact?
Keshav —No, Broome; for we must always remember that the
elements of a generic type must have certain virtues without which they would
not belong to the type: as the poet says
One touch of nature makes the whole world kin.
Wilson —Then where do you find your variety?
Keshav —If you will compare the elements of those types in which
the harmony is perfect, your ignorance will vanish like a mist. You will see at
once that every planet develops indeed his planetary qualities, but varies from
every other planet, and if Venus be the name and the star be feminine, is a
dovelike white in complexion and yields an effulgence more tender than a girl's
blush, but if he is Mars, burns with the sanguine fire of battle and rolls like
a bloodshot eye through space, and if he is Saturn, has seven moons in his
starry seraglio, and is richly orange in complexion like vapour coloured by the
sun's pencil when he sets, and wears a sevenfold girdle of burning fire blue as
a witch's eye and green as Love's parrot and red as the lips of Cleopatra and
indeed of all manner of beautiful colours, and if he is Jupiter or any one of
the planets, has the qualities of that planet and has not the qualities of
another, but develops his own personality and has no regard for any model or the
example of any other planet.
And if you drop your eyes from the sublimer astral spaces to
the modest gauds of Earth our mother, you will see that every flower has indeed
the qualities of its floral nature, but varies widely from her sister beauties,
and if she is a lily, hides in her argent beaker a treasure of golden dust and
her beauty is a young and innocent bride on her marriage-morning, but if she is
a crocus, has a bell-like beauty and is absorbed in the intoxication of her own
loveliness and wears now the gleaming robe of sunrise and now a dark and
delicate purple, and now a
Page – 55
soft and sorrowful pallor, but, if she is a rose, has the
fragrance of a beautiful soul and the vivid colour of a gorgeous poem, yet
conceals a sharp sting beneath the nestling luxury of her glorious petals, and
if she is a hyacinth or honeysuckle or meadow-sweet, has the poisonous perfume
of the meadow-sweet or the soul-subduing fragrance of the honeysuckle or the
passionate cry of the hyacinth, and not the beautiful egoism of the crocus or
the oriental splendour of the rose, but develops her own qualities without
aspiring to the qualities of any and every flower.
May we not then say that the dominant principle regulating
the variety of individual types is the evolution of individual as distinct from
generic virtues?
Wilson —That is the logical consequence.
Keshav —Then the description of individual virtue runs thus, the
evolution by the human being of the inborn qualities and powers native to his
personality; that is to say, just as every beautiful building has the solid
earth for its basis but is built in a distinct style of architecture, so the
beautiful human soul will rest on the solid basis of humanity but build up for
itself a personality distinct and individual.
Wilson —That is exactly what the virtuous man must do.
Keshav —And so with infinite ease and smoothness we have glided
up to the third rung of our ladder, as if we were running up a broad and marble
stair-case. Here then let us stop and reflect on all we have said and consider
whether from confusion of mind or inability to comprehend the whole situation we
have made any mistake or omission. For my part I avow that my thoughts have not
been so lucid tonight as I could have wished. We are then to continue the
inquiry in the Gardens on Tuesday afternoon? I think that was what you
suggested.
Wilson —Yes, on Tuesday at half-past two.
Keshav —Would you mind my bringing Prince Paradox with me? He is
anxious to hear how we are dealing with our idea and as he will be perfectly
willing to go the lengths we have so far gone, we need not fear that he will be
a drag on us.
Wilson —I am perfectly willing that he should come. The more,
the merrier.
Page – 56
Keshav —Not at this stage; for this intellectual ascent up the
precipice of discovery, is indeed very exciting and pleasant, but strains the
muscles of the mind more than a year's academical work; and I trust that next
time we shall bring it to a satisfying conclusion.
End of the Second Book
Keshav Ganesh — Broome
Wilson —Treneth
Treneth —But we must not forget our purpose in being here.
Keshav —Well, Broome, what do you say to our resuming our cruise for the discovery of virtue? I avow the speculation
weighs on me, and I am impatient to see the last of it.
Wilson —I have not to learn that you are the most indolent of men. No sooner are you in a novel current of thought than you tire and swim back to the shore. I am indignant with Nature for wasting on you a genius you so little appreciate.
Treneth —Ah but you
are really quite wrong, Wilson. Genius is a capacity for being indolent.
Wilson —Enter Prince Paradox! But seriously, Keshav, I
think the argument will live beyond this afternoon and I give warning that I shall drag you all over the field of ethics before we have done with it.
Keshav —It will be
the corpse of my intellect you will mal treat. But in extremity I rely upon Treneth to slay my Argus with the bright edge of a paradox.
Wilson —We were at the third rung of the ladder, were we not?
Keshav —Yes, thou slave-driving Ishmaelite. I declare it is impious on a day like this to bury ourselves in the gloomy vaults of speculation. But as you will.
To remember how far we have climbed, is the best incentive
to climb farther, and will give Treneth an idea of the situation. We happened to be weighing the ordinary principles of morality
and finding them all wanting cast about for a new principle and discovered that beauty was the sole morality of the universe,
and it had colour, form and perfume as elements, harmony as its general effect and proportion, which we described as regular
Page – 58
With these projections from the rock of speculation to help us we climbed up the three steep and difficult rungs I am going
to describe to you. We argued that the only way to remedy
a note that rebels against the spirit of the composition is to
reduce it into harmony with that spirit, and so arrived at the conclusion that the principle of morality is to apply to human
life the principles that govern the rest of the Cosmos. There you have the first rung of our ladder.
We recommenced from this basis and by remembrance of the nature of proportion or regular variety which is the cause of
harmony and throughout every natural type of beauty appears in the common principle which determines their line of variance
from each other, we thought that in the elements of the Cosmos there must be such a common principle and found it to be the
evolution by each element of its own peculiar virtue as distinct from the peculiar virtues of every other element, and so reached
our second conclusion, that just as
astral virtue lies in the evolution by the star of the inborn qualities and powers native to its astral character, just so human virtue lies in the evolution by the human being of the inborn qualities and powers native to
his humanity. This is the second rung of our ladder.
With this second secure basis behind us, we went on to
discover that within generic types such as the star, the flower, the human being, there were individual types governed by the
similar but different principle of
evolving the individual as distinct from the generic virtues, or, when applied to the human being, of evolving the inborn qualities and powers native to his
personality. This is the third rung of our ladder.
Have I been correct in my statement, Broome?
Wilson —Perfectly correct.
Treneth —My only quarrel with your conclusions is that
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you have wasted a couple of evenings in arriving at them. Why, except the first they are mere axioms.
Keshav —Yes, to the seeing eye they are axioms, but to the unseeing eye they are paradoxes. The truths that are old and
stale to the philosopher, are to the multitude new and startling and dangerous. But now that we have all mounted to the same rung, let us pursue the ascent. And I suppose our immediate step will be to find whether the mere evolution of the inborn qualities
and powers is or is not the sole requisite for virtue.
Wilson —Before we go to that, Keshav, you will have to
meet a difficulty which you show every sign of evading.
Keshav
—Whatever difficulty there is, I am ready to solve,
but I cannot guess to what you refer.
Wilson —I suppose you will admit that a definition, to be
adequate, must have nothing vague or indefinite about it?
Keshav
—If there is anything vague, it must be elucidated or our statement falls to the ground.
Treneth —I dissent: a definite definition is a contradiction
in terms. I am for definite indefinitions.
Keshav —I am not in extremities yet, Prince Paradox.
Wilson —Well now, is not your phrasing "the inborn qualities and powers native to
our humanity" very vague and indefinite?
Keshav —Indefinite, I admit, and I cannot think that an
objection but I plead not guilty to the charge of vagueness.
Wilson —You think with Treneth that a definition should
not be definite?
Keshav —If by being definite is implied reduction to its
primal elements you will agree with me that a definition need not
be definite: or do you want me to enumerate the qualities native
to our humanity such as
physical vigour, and the faculty of inference and sexual passion and I do not know how many more?
Wilson —You shall not escape me so easily, Keshav. You are merely spinning dialectical cobwebs which give a specious
appearance to the pit in which you would have us fall.
Keshav
—Then by pointing out the trap, you can easily
sweep away my sophistical cobwebs, my good Broome.
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Treneth —What penalty for a pun?
Keshav —No penalty, for to punish a lie on the information
of Beelzebub is to do God's work at the devil's bidding.
Wilson —Yes, a penalty: you shall be taken at your word. You are setting a trap for us, when you try to shuffle in your phrase about the qualities native to our humanity. If we leave this
inexplicit and unlimited, you will be at liberty to describe any quality you choose as a virtue and any other quality you choose as a defect by assuming in your own insinuating manner that it is
or is not native to our
humanity. And in reality there is a very distinct gulf between those of our qualities which are native to our humanity and those others which belong to the animal nature we
are working out of our composition; for example between lust and love, of which one belongs to the lower animal nature and
the other to the higher spiritual. You are ignoring the distinction and by ignoring it, you ignore the patent fact of evolution.
Treneth —To ignore facts is the beginning of thought.
Keshav —No, but to forget facts for the time being
-that is the beginning of thought.
Wilson —My dear Keshav, pray don't trail a red paradox across the path.
Keshav —It was the other boy who did it. To return to
the subject, are you really unconscious of the flagrant errors of which you have been so lavish in a little space?
Wilson —I am quite unconscious of any error.
Keshav —You have made three to my knowledge, and the
first is your assumption that what is animal, cannot be human.
Wilson —Can you disprove it?
Keshav —Can you prove it? In the first place you cannot tell what is animal and what is not.
Wilson —Why, the qualities possessed by human beings as distinct from animals are those which are not animal.
Keshav —And, I suppose, qualities possessed in common by human beings and animals, are animal?
Wilson —You are right.
Keshav —And such qualities ought to be worked out of our
composition?
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Wilson —Yes, as Tennyson says, we ought to be
working out
The tiger and the ape.
Keshav —Then we ought to get rid of fidelity, ought we not?
Wilson —Why so?
Keshav —Because it is a quality possessed in common by
the dog and the human being, and the dog is an animal.
Treneth
—Of course we should. Fidelity is a disease like
conscience.
Keshav —And infidelity is a quality possessed in common
by the cat and the human being, and therefore we ought to get rid of infidelity.
Treneth —Again of course; for infidelity is merely a relative term, and if fidelity is not, then how can infidelity be?
Keshav —And so we must get rid of all opposing qualities and acquire a dead neutrality? Your ambition then is not to be a personality, but to be a
-negative?
Treneth —I confess you have taken me in the flank: even
my paradoxes will not carry me so far.
Keshav —And you, Broome, are you willing to break down
the ladder by which we are climbing?
Wilson —Not for a moment. What I mean is that the qualities possessed in common by all the animals and the human being are animal.
Keshav —Is not the human being an animal?
Wilson —Yes, scientifically.
Keshav —But not really?
Wilson —Well, he is something more than an animal.
Keshav —You mean he has other qualities besides those which belong to the animal type?
Wilson —That is what I mean.
Keshav —And has not the planet other qualities besides
those which belong to the astral type?
Wilson —Yes.
Keshav —Does that warrant us in saying that a planet is not really a star?
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Wilson —No.
Keshav —And are we warranted in saying that man is not
really an animal?
Wilson —We are not.
Keshav —And the animal world is an element in the Cosmos, is it not?
Wilson —Yes.
Keshav —Is it not then the virtue of an animal to evolve
the qualities and powers native to his animality?
Wilson —I suppose so.
Keshav —And man, being an animal, ought also to evolve the qualities and powers native to his animality?
Wilson —That seems to follow, but is not this to cancel our old description of human virtue and break down our second
rung?
Keshav —No, for just as the qualities native to a planet
include the qualities native to a star, so the qualities native to the human type include the qualities native to the animal type.
Wilson —I quite agree with you now. What was my second error?
Keshav —You talked of the lower animal nature and the higher spiritual nature
and in so talking assumed that the qualities peculiar to the human being are higher than the qualities he shares with some or all of the animals. Is dissimulation higher
than love? You reject the idea with contempt: yet dissimulation is peculiar to the human being but love, and love of the most
spiritual kind, he shares with the turtle-dove
and with the wild duck of the Indian marshes, who cannot sleep the live-long night
because Nature has severed him from his mate but ever wails across the cold and lapping water with passionate entreaty that
she may solace his anguish with even a word, and travellers straying in the forest hear his forlorn cry "Love, speak to me!"
No, we can only say of varying qualities that one is beautiful and another less beautiful, or not beautiful at all; and beauty
does not reside in being animal or being more than animal but in something very different.
Wilson —And my third error?
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Keshav —Your third error was to confound evolution with elimination.
Wilson —And does it not really come to that?
Keshav —The vulgar opinion, which finds a voice as usual
in Tennyson -what opinion of the British average does he not echo?
-the vulgar opinion learns that the principle of evolution or gradual perfection is the reigning principle of life and adapts the idea to its own stupid fallacy that perfection implies the
elimination of all that is vivid and picturesque and likely to foster a personality. Evolution does not eliminate but perfects.
Wilson —But surely perfection tends to eliminate what is imperfect?
Keshav —Oh I don't deny that we have lost our tails, but so has a Manx cat.
Treneth —Dear me! that is a fruitful idea. A dissertation proving that the Manx cat is the crowning effort of Evolution
might get me a Fellowship.
Keshav —It would deserve it for its originality. Moreover if we have lost our tails, we have also lost our wings.
Treneth —I maintain that the tails are the more serious loss.
Wings would have been useful and we do not want them but we
do want tails, for they would have been lovely appendages and a
magnificent final flourish to the beauty of the human figure. Just fancy the Dean and Provost pacing up to the Communion Table
with a fine long tail swishing about their ears! What a glorious lesson! What a sublime and instructive spectacle!
Wilson —You are incorrigibly frivolous, Treneth.
Keshav —If Prince
Paradox is frivolous, he is virtuous, in so far as he is developing the virtue most intimately native to his
personality; and the inquiry is dull enough at present to bear
occasional touches of enlivening laughter.
Wilson —Yet the inquiry must pass through stifling underground galleries and to avoid them is puerile.
Keshav —I am at one with you, but if we must dive under
the ground, there is no need to linger there.
Evolution does not eliminate, but perfects. The cruelty that
blossoms out in the tiger, has its seeds deep down in the nature
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Wilson —You are growing almost as paradoxical as Prince Paradox, Keshav.
Keshav —Look for
Truth and you will find her at the bottom of a paradox. Are you convinced that animal qualities are not the worse for being animal?
Wilson —Perfectly convinced.
Keshav —And here I
cannot do better than quote a sentence that like so many of Meredith's sentences, goes like a knife to the root of the matter. "As she grows in the flesh when
discreetly tended, nature is unimpeachable, flowerlike, yet not too decoratively a flower; you must have her with the stem,
the thorns, the roots, and the fat bedding of roses." And since I have quoted that immortal chapter so overloaded with truth
critical, truth psychologic and truth philosophic, let me use two
other sentences to point the moral of this argument and bid
you embrace "Reality's infinite sweetness" and "touch the skirts
of Philosophy by sharing her hatred of the sham decent, her
derision of sentimentalism." May we not now ascend to the fourth rung?
Wilson —Yes, I think we may go on.
Keshav —I am especially eager to do so because I am more
and more convinced that our description of virtue is no longer adequate: for if the only requisite is to evolve our innate qualities,
will it not be enough to be merely cruel and not to be cruel in a refined and beautiful manner?
Wilson —Plainly it will.
Keshav —And is it really enough to be merely cruel?
Treneth —No, for to be inartistic is the only sin.
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Keshav —Your paradox cuts to the heart of the truth. Can you tell me, Broome, whether is the rose more beautiful than the
bramble or the bramble than the rose?
Wilson —Obviously the rose than the bramble.
Keshav —And why is this? Is it not because the thorn develops unduly the thorn and does not harmonize it with leaves but is careless of proportion and the eternal principle of harmony, and is beautiful indeed as an element in the harmony of plants
but has no pretensions to personal beauty but the rose subdues the thorn into harmony with the leaf and the blossom and is
perfectly beautiful in herself no less than as an element in the harmony of flowers?
Wilson —I believe you are right.
Keshav —And must not cruelty, the thorn of our beautiful
human rose, be subdued into harmony with his other qualities and
among them tenderness and clemency and generous forbearance and other qualities seemingly the most opposed to cruelty and then only will it be a real virtue but until then nothing more
than a potential virtue?
Wilson —You are right; then only will it be a real virtue.
Keshav —So we must modify our description of virtue by affixing an epithet to the word "evolution", and preferably I
think the epithet "perfect" which does not imply size or degree or intensity or anything but justness of harmony, for example
in a poem, which is not
called perfect when it is merely long-drawn-out or overflowing with passion or gorgeous even to
swooning, but when it blends all the elements of beauty into an irreproachable harmony. We shall then describe virtue as the
perfect evolution by the human being of the inborn qualities and powers native to his personality.
Wilson —With that I have no quarrel, but am I too inquisitive when I ask you how cruelty and tenderness can live
together?
Keshav —My dear Broome, I shall never think you too
inquisitive but above all things desire that you should have a clear intelligence of my meaning. Have you never learned by
experience or otherwise how a girl will torment her favoured
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Wilson —Yes, I know, some women are like that.
Keshav —If you had said most women were like that, you would have hit the truth more nearly. And this trait in women
we impute to feminine insincerity and to maiden coyness and
to everything but the real motive, and that is the primitive and
eternal passion of cruelty appearing in the coarse fibre of man
as crude and inartistic barbarity, but in the sweet and delicate
soul of woman as a refined and beautiful playfulness and the inseparable correlative of a gentle and suave disposition.
Wilson —But I am inclined to credit the girl with the purpose of giving a keener relish to the gratified desire by enhancing
the difficulty of attainment, and in that case she will be actuated not by cruelty but always by tenderness.
Keshav —You think she is actuated by the principles of Political Economy? I cannot agree with you.
Treneth —And I deny the truth of the principle. A precious thing easily acquired is treasured for its beauty and worth, but if
acquired with pain and labour, the memory of the effort leaves a bad taste in the mouth which it is difficult to expunge. I read
Vergil at school and never read a line of him now but Catullus I skimmed through in my arm-chair and love and appreciate.
Keshav —Your distinction is subtle and suggestive, Treneth, but it never occurred to me in that light before.
Treneth —It never occurred to me in that light before.
Keshav —Yet I do not think it applies to our lovers, and it does not apply always, for the poem I have perfected with labour and thought is surely dearer to me than the light carol thrown
off in the happy inspiration of the moment. Rapid generalities seldom cover more than a few cases. So I will take Broome on
his own ground, not because I cannot adduce other instances of
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cruelty and tenderness living in wedded felicity, but because I do not want to fatigue myself by recollecting them.
And now, Broome, will you say that a tyrant who desires to give his favourite a keener relish of luxury and strains him on the rack and washes him with scalding oil and dries him with nettles and flays him with whips and then only comforts him with the
luxury of downy pillows and velvet cushions and perfect repose, has not been actuated by cruelty but always by tenderness?
Wilson —Oh, of course, if you cite extravagant instances--!
Keshav —And will you say that the girl who wishes to give her kiss a sweeter savour on the lips of her favourite and strains him on the rack of suspense and washes him with the
scalding oil of despair and dries him with the nettles of hope and flays him with the whips of desire and then only comforts
him with the velvet luxury of a kiss and the downy cushion of an embrace and the perfect repose of desire fulfilled, has not been
actuated by cruelty but always by tenderness and not rather that all unnecessary pain is cruelty to the sufferer?
Wilson —Certainly, unnecessary pain is cruelty.
Keshav —Are you perfectly satisfied?
Wilson —Perfectly satisfied.
Keshav —We have discovered then that perfect evolution is
requisite for perfect virtue, but I do not think we have distilled
its full flavour into the epithet. Or are you of the opinion that
we want nothing more than the harmonizing of all the inborn
qualities?
Wilson —I cannot think of any other requisite.
Keshav —Can you, Treneth?
Treneth —I was much attracted by something you said in the beginning about the elements of beauty and I suspect it is
these we want now.
Keshav —You have exactly hit it. We described it as not
merely harmony in effect
and proportion in detail but as possessed of one of the three elements, colour, perfume and form,
and in most types combining at least two and in many all three. But in confining our outlook to harmony and proportion we
have talked as if human virtue were merely possessed of one
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Wilson —No reason whatever.
Keshav —Well, might
we not inquire whether it does possess all three, and if it does not, whether it may not legitimately or, to speak more properly, may not artistically possess all three?
Wilson —By all means, let us inquire.
Keshav —And if we find that it may artistically possess
them, then, if our theory that beauty should be the governing principle in all things, is really correct, must we not say that they
not only may but ought to possess all three?
Wilson —Evidently we must.
Treneth —That is as plain as a Cambridge laundress.
Keshav —And it is
clear that all qualities may, with diligence, be entirely divested of colour, form and perfume, and when
they have reached the stage of wanting every single element of beauty, we need take no notice of them, for they have no longer anything to do with virtue, until they begin to
redevelop.
Wilson —Obviously, for we are talking of perfect virtue or
perfect beauty of character.
Keshav —Now if we have not the qualities requisite for a given action, we shall not achieve the action, supposing we attempt it, but shall only achieve a blunder, is it not so?
Wilson —Clearly.
Keshav —But if we have the qualities, we are likely to
achieve the action?
Wilson —Necessarily.
Keshav —Then is not action the outward manifestation of a quality, and I include in action any movement physical or
intellectual which is visible or whose effects are visible to the human understanding?
Wilson —Yes, but may not an action manifest the want of a quality?
Keshav —No doubt, but we need not touch on those, since we have not to develop defects in order to be virtuous, or do
you think we need?
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Treneth —Clearly not: negatives cannot be virtues.
Keshav —That is a
very just sentiment and I shall have occasion to recall it. Now is not a battle the outward manifestation
of the warlike qualities?
Wilson —Evidently.
Keshav —And composition the outward manifestation of
the poetical qualities, I mean, of course, the qualities of a maker?
Wilson —Yes.
Keshav —And do we not mean that the poetical qualities express themselves in composition just as the sidereal in a star?
Wilson —We do.
Keshav —And is not
the star the form of the sidereal qualities?
Wilson —Yes.
Keshav —Then is not composition the form of the poetical qualities?
Wilson —That follows.
Keshav —And battle of the warlike qualities?
Wilson —That also.
Keshav —Then is not action the form of a quality, that is
to say the shape in which it expresses itself?
Wilson —So it seems.
Keshav —So we find that virtue has a form.
Wilson —But may not qualities have a form apart from action?
Treneth —For example, thought.
Keshav —But the expression of thought is included in action for our purpose.
Treneth —For our purpose only.
Keshav —As you
please. I merely want to use one projection from the rock and not imperil my neck by clutching two in one hand.
Treneth —I am satisfied.
Keshav —I suppose, Broome, you mean by form a concrete
shape?
Wilson —I suppose so.
Keshav —Then you must see that qualities unexpressed in
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Wilson —I too am satisfied.
Keshav —Then we are agreed that a quality must possess form, that is to say, express itself in action or it will not be a
virtue?
Treneth —May it not prefer to express itself in perfume and
colour?
Keshav —I had forgotten that.
Now if we inquire what colour is, we shall see that it is nothing concrete but merely an effect on the retina of the eye,
and its prosperity lies in the eye that sees it, and if the retina of the eye is perfect, every different shade impresses itself, but if imperfect, then the eye is blind to one or more colours. Will you agree with me when I say that anything to which we give the
name of colour must be the reverse of concrete?
Wilson —That follows.
Keshav —Then the colour of a virtue must be the reverse of concrete.
Wilson —Evidently.
Keshav —Now let us take metaphor into our counsel, for
metaphor has sometimes an
intuitive way of chiming consonantly with the truth; and metaphor tells us that we often talk of a scarlet and sinful character and of a white and innocent character and of a neutral and drab-coloured character, and
assign various colours to various women and call one woman a splendid carnation, for we are fond of comparing women to
flowers and another a beautiful and gorgeous rose, and a third
a pure and sinless lily and yet another a modest violet betraying
herself only by her fragrance, and are all the while implying that
to the imaginative eye, if the retina is perfect, various characters
have various colours. Do you follow me?
Treneth
—Yes, the idea is fine.
Wilson —And true.
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Treneth —That is immaterial.
Keshav —And character is the composition of qualities just
as a poem is the composition of sounds and a painting the composition of pigments.
Wilson —Yes, just in that sense.
Keshav —Then is it not plain that if a character has colour,
the qualities of which it is composed must have colour.
Wilson —I think it is.
Keshav —And colour is not concrete, but an effect on the retina of the eye?
Wilson —So we said.
Keshav —Then is not the colour of a quality its effect on
the retina of the imaginative eye?
Wilson —Yes.
Keshav —And a quality in itself may be formless?
Wilson —Yes.
Keshav —Then to the imaginative eye is not a quality pure colour?
Wilson —I suppose so.
Keshav —But the
imaginative eye is not one with the perceptive eye, for it perceives what
does not exist, but the perceptive eye only what does exist.
Wilson —You are right.
Keshav —I mean that nothing without form can have an
effect on the retina of the perceptive eye.
Wilson —That is evident.
Keshav —Then to be visible to the perceptive eye, the colour of a quality, which is really the soul of the quality, must
suffuse the action which expresses it, which is the body of the quality.
Wilson —It must.
Keshav —And is colour without form a perfect type of
beauty?
Wilson —No.
Keshav —Then a quality must suffuse its body with its soul, or, since the word action is growing ambiguous, its expression
with its colour.
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Wilson —Yes, I agree to that.
Keshav —And so the quality will so suffuse its expression
as to be visible to the perceptive eye, just as the soul of a rose, which is the effect on the retina of the imaginative eye, suffuses
her form with colour which is the effect on the retina of the perceptive eye, and varies according to the variety of colours,
and if two roses have the same form but one is crimson and the other yellow, the soul of the red rose is seen to be scarlet with
unholy passion, but the soul of the yellow rose is seen to be dull and blanched and languid, like the reaction after intensely voluptuous enjoyment.
And so virtue may possess both form and colour, and, I
suppose, may artistically possess
both, or will colour be detrimental to the perfection of virtue as tinting to the perfection of
sculpture?
Treneth —By no means; for qualities are not hewn out of
marble or cast in beaten gold or chiselled in Indian ivory, but are moulded in the delicate and flower-like texture of human
emotion and, if colourless, are scarcely beautiful.
Keshav
—Then we are agreed that a quality must possess
both form and colour, or will not be a perfect virtue?
Treneth
—Plainly.
Wilson —I am afraid I hardly understand what we are saying.
Keshav —I am certain I do not; but we must follow where the argument leads us, and I have a glimmering intelligence
which I hope to see expanding into perfect daylight; but I do not want any side issue to distract my thoughts and will go on to inquire what is the perfume of a quality: for I am like a frail canoe that wavers through a tranquil to be buffeted outside by
the swelling waters and have with difficulty plunged through these two waves of form and colour, when I see rolling down on me with its curled forehead this third wave of perfume which
I do not hope to outlive. But to the venturous Fortune is as
compliant as a captive Briseis and I will boldly plunge into the crash of the breaking water and call manner the perfume of a quality, for in manner resides the subtle aroma and sense of
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something delicious but impalpable which is what we mean by perfume.
Treneth —With your usual good luck you have notched your mark in the centre.
Keshav —So by audacity I have outlived the third wave and am more than ever convinced that you must take liberties with
Fortune before she will love you.
I suppose you will agree with me that for a virtue to be
beautiful, there must be a perfect harmony in the elements of beauty, and the colour not too subdued as in the clover nor too
glaring as in the sunflower, and the perfume not too slight to be noticeable as in the pansy nor too intense for endurance as
in the meadow-sweet, and the form not too monotonous as in
a canal or too irregular as in the leafless tree, but all perfectly
harmonious in themselves and in fit proportion to each other?
Wilson —From our description of beauty, that is evident.
Treneth —I plead not guilty on behalf of the sunflower, but agree with the sentiment.
Keshav —And now since Broome and I are at a loss to conjecture what we mean, do you not think we shall be enlightened by a concrete example?
Treneth —It is likely.
Wilson —Let us at least make an attempt.
Keshav —We will call on the stage the girl and her lover,
who have been so useful to us. It is clear at once that if she is not virtuous but harmonizes the elements of beauty unskilfully,
the passion of her favourite will wither and not expand.
Wilson —That is clear.
Keshav —What then will be her manner of harmonizing them?
Wilson —I return the question to you.
Keshav —Well now, will she not harmonize the phases of
her dalliance, and hesitate on the brink of yielding just at the
proper pitch of his despair, and elude his kiss just at the proper
pitch of his expectancy, and fan his longing when it sinks, and check it when it rises, and surrender herself when he is smouldering with hopeless passion?
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Wilson — That is probably what she will do.
Keshav — And is not that to cast her dalliance in a beautiful
form?
Wilson — It is.
Keshav — But she will not do this grossly and palpably, but
will lead up to everything by looks and tones and gestures so as to glide from one to the other without his perceiving and will
sweeten the hard and obvious form by the flavour of the simple
and natural, yet will be all the while the veriest
coquette and artist in flirtation.
Wilson — Yes, that is what a girl like that would do.
Keshav — And is not that to give a subtle perfume to her
dalliance?
Wilson — I suppose it is.
Keshav — But if she is perfect in the art, will she not, even
when repulsing him most cruelly, allow a secret tenderness to run
through her words and manner, and when she is most tenderly
yielding, will she not show the sharp edge of asperity through the
flowers, and in a word allow the blended cruelty and sweetness
of her soul to be just palpable to his perceptive senses?
Wilson — She will.
Keshav — And is not that to suffuse her dalliance with
colour?
Wilson — Plainly.
Keshav — And moreover she will not allow her affectation
of the natural to be too imperfect to conceal her art or so heavily
scented as to betray the intention, or the colour to be unnoticeable from slightness or from intensity to spoil the delicate
effect of her perverseness, or the form to engross too largely the
attention, or indeed any element to fall too short or carry too
far, but will subdue the whole trio into a just and appropriate
harmony.
Wilson — If she wants to be a perfect flirt, that is what she
will do.
Keshav — And if coquetry is native in her, to be a perfect
flirt will be highest pinnacle of virtue.
Wilson — That follows from the premisses.
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Keshav — And so here we have a concrete example of perfect virtue, and begin to understand what we mean by the perfect
evolution of an inborn quality, or are you still unenlightened?
Wilson — No, I perfectly understand.
Keshav — Hither then we have climbed with much more
laborious effort and have almost cut our hands in two on the
projections, but do at last really stand on the fourth and last
rung of the ladder.
Wilson — The last? I rather fancy we are only half way up
and shall have to ascend another three or four rungs before we
are kissed by the fresh winds that carol on the brow. I have
many things to ask you and you have as yet spoken nothing of
the relations between man and man and how this new morality is to be modified by the needs of society and what justice means
and what self-sacrifice and indeed a thousand things which will
need many hours to investigate.
Keshav — I am Frankenstein saddled with a monster of my
own making and have made a man to my ruin and a young man to my hurt. Nevertheless "lead on, monster: we'll follow."
Treneth —Will you not rest on the fourth rung and have a cup of tea in my rooms before you resume?
Keshav — But shall we not put a stop to your spheroids and trianguloids and asinoids and all the other figures of mathematical ingenuity?
Treneth —I am at present watching a body which revolves on six screws and is consequently very drunk, and a day off
will sensibly assist my speculations.
Keshav — So let it be, but before we go I may as well recall to you at a glance what is our fourth rung.
We have expanded our description of virtue as the evolution
of the inborn qualities native to our personality, by throwing in
the epithet "perfect", and have interpreted the full flavour of the epithet in words to the effect that
qualities in their evolved perfection must be harmonious one with another and have a beautiful form or expression, and a beautiful colour or revelation of
the soul, and a beautiful perfume or justly-attempered manner and must subdue all three into a just and appropriate harmony.
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With this conviction in our souls
we will journey on, despising the censure and alarm of the reputable, and evolve
our inborn qualities and powers into a beautiful and harmonious
perfection, until we walk delicately like living poems through a radiant air, and will not stunt the growth of any branch or
blossom, but will prefer to the perishable laurels of this world a living crown of glory, and hear through the chaotic murmur of the ages the solemn question of Christ "What profiteth it
a man if he own the whole world and lose his own soul?" and will
answer according to the melodious doctrines of philosophy and acquire by a life of perfect beauty the peace of God that passeth
all understanding.
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