EIGHT
The Training of the Logical Faculty
THE
training of the logical reason must necessarily follow the training of the
faculties which collect the material on which the logical reason must work. Not
only so but the mind must have some development of the faculty of
dealing with words before it can deal successfully with ideas. The question is,
once this preliminary work is done, what is the best way of teaching the boy to
think correctly from premises. For the logical reason cannot proceed without
premises. It either infers from facts to a conclusion, or from previously formed
conclusions to a fresh one, or from one fact to another. It either induces,
deduces or simply infers. I see the sunrise day after day, I conclude or induce
that it rises as a law daily after a varying interval of darkness. I have
already ascertained that wherever there is smoke, there is fire. I have induced
that general rule from an observation of facts. I deduce that in a particular
case of smoke there is a fire behind. I infer that a man must have lit it from
the improbability of any other cause under the particular circumstances. I
cannot deduce it because fire is not always created by human kindling; it may be
volcanic or caused by a stroke of lightning or the sparks from some kind of
friction in the neighbourhood.
There are three elements necessary to correct reasoning: first, the correctness
of the facts or conclusions I start from, secondly, the completeness as well as
the accuracy of the data I start from, thirdly, the elimination of other
possible or impossible conclusions from the same facts. The fallibility of the
logical reason is due partly to avoidable negligence and looseness in securing
these conditions, partly to the difficulty of getting all the facts correct,
still more to the difficulty of getting all the facts complete, most of all, to
the extreme difficulty of eliminating all possible conclusions except the one
which happens to be right.
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No fact is supposed to be mare perfectly established than the universality of
the Law of Gravitation as an imperative rule, yet a single new fact
inconsistent with it would upset this sup- posed universality. And such facts
exist. Nevertheless by care and keenness the fallibility may be reduced to its
minimum.
The usual practice is to train the logical reason by teaching the science of Logic. This is an instance of the prevalent error by which book knowledge of a thing is made the object of the study instead of the thing itself. The
experience of reasoning and its errors should be given to the mind and it
should be taught to
observe haw these work far itself; it should proceed from the example to
the rule and from the accumulating harmony of rules to the formal science of
the subject, not from the formal science to the rule, and from the rule to
the example.
The first step is to make the young mind interest itself in drawing inferences
from the facts, tracing cause and effect. It should then be led on to notice
its successes and its failures and the reason of the success and of the
failure; the incorrectness of the fact started from, the haste in drawing
conclusions from insufficient facts, the carelessness in accepting a
conclusion which is improbable, little supported by the data or open to
doubt, the indolence or prejudice which does not wish to consider other
possible explanations or conclusions. In this way the mind can be trained to
reason as correctly as the fallibility of human logic will allow,
minimising the chances of error. The study of formal logic should be
postponed to a later time when it can easily be mastered in a very brief
period, since it will be only the systematising of an art perfectly well-known
to the student.
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