-58_Facts and Opinions 25-12-1909.htm

Facts and Opinions

Volume I - Dec. 25, 1909 – Number 25

The United Congress Negotiations

The persistence of the Bengalee in shielding Moderate obstinacy under cover of an appeal to the wholly inconclusive proceedings of the private Conference in the Amrita Bazar Office last year shows both the paucity of possible arguments for the Moderate position and the readiness of its chief organ to ignore facts of which it has been reminded more than once and which it cannot deny. The difference between the conference last year and the recent negotiations is radical. That conference was between Conventionists and non-Conventionists, the recent negotiations were between Moderates and Nationalists. The Amrita Bazar Office Conference was an attempt made by certain leaders in Bengal and Maharashtra to secure admission for the Nationalists to the Convention. The United Congress Committee was confined to Bengal and sat to consider whether Bengal Moderates and Nationalists could not agree together before inviting the Conventionists of other provinces to accept the terms offered by United Bengal. Last year’s Conference was a confabulation of leading men representing their own opinions only, this year’s negotiations were conducted by men elected for the purpose by the Provincial Conference representing the whole of Bengal. At the Conference in Bagbazar it was the middle section of opinion, neither Moderate nor Nationalist, of which Sj. Motilal Ghose, Rai Jotindranath Chaudhuri, and some of the older leaders in the Mofussil are the most influential members, which engineered a compromise in the absence of the Nationalist leaders. Sj. Tilak was a prisoner in Mandalay jail, Sj. Aurobindo Ghose under trial at Alipur, Sj. Khaparde and Sj. Bepin Chandra Pal absent in England. The compromise was reluctantly accepted by many of the Nationalists present, — as we have ascertained by correspondence with some of the chief Nationalists who attended, — and only because it was pressed on them

that these were the only terms on which the Moderate Party would admit of the idea of union. It was not accepted at all by the Bengal Nationalists and it has been recently admitted by the Amrita Bazar Patrika that letters were received from the Mofussil repudiating the surrender on the question of the creed. How is it that the Bengalee persists in ignoring these facts ? The compromise was rejected by the Moderates themselves, Bombay refusing utterly to recognise the four Calcutta resolutions as a possible part of any treaty, and this was recognised by the Moderates this year; for at the first meeting of the United Congress Committee it was distinctly intimated to the Nationalist members that the four resolutions must not be pressed as a condition of union. In other words the one concession for which some of the leading Nationalists induced themselves to waive their rooted objections to constitution and creed, is expunged and the Nationalists are expected to be bound by a rejected compromise by which the Moderates refuse to be bound. They are expected to adhere to the concessions they made last year, while the only concession made to them is withdrawn. This fact is quite sufficient by itself to put the Bengalee‘s argument out of court. We repeat that the recent negotiations had nothing to do with last year’s abortive compromise, rejected as it was by both parties immediately after it was made. Their sole object was to ascertain whether the Moderates would accept substantial concessions from the Nationalists without asking the latter to sacrifice their conscience and their principles. Apparently they are not. Therefore union is impossible.

A New Sophism

Another and very singular argument is advanced by the Bengalee which evinces a similar disregard of facts and of the real significance of facts. It is alleged that both sides in Bengal are agreed as to the four resolutions, that the creed is part of the four resolutions, that the creed was accepted by the Nationalists at Pabna and therefore they ought not to object to sign it as a condition of entering the Congress. In the first place, if the four resolutions

are to be so binding on the Nationalists that they must be ready to sign one of them at the call of the Moderates, then they must be made equally binding on the Moderates and we call on them to sign a declaration of acceptance of the Boycott as a condition of entry into an United Congress. Just as the Moderates from Bombay accepted the Boycott resolution at Calcutta in deference to the weight of public opinion, so we accepted the Colonial self-government resolution as the opinion of the majority and are no more bound to subscribe to it personally than Sir Pherozshah Mehta is bound to subscribe to the Boycott. The four resolutions merely framed a compromise between the two political schools, not a declaration of Nationalist faith. As for Bengal, it is well-known that the whole of Bengal does not accept Colonial self-government as the ultimate goal of political aspiration. At Pabna it was only to avoid a discussion dangerous to unity that the Nationalists contented themselves, in spite of the majority they had, with placing their dissent on record through the mouth of Sj. Manoranjan Guha. The Bengalee cannot have forgotten that incident. It was revived again at Hughly when the Moderates insisted on whittling down the Boycott to a mere commercial measure as a price of their adherence to the Conference and Sj. Aurobindo Ghose desired to bring forward an amendment, which he would subsequently withdraw, in order to mark that the Nationalists did not accept the resolution as the opinion of the country. The Moderate leaders threatened to withdraw if this was done and Sj. Aurobindo Ghose was requested to confine himself to the precedent established by Sj. Manoranjan Guha at Pabna. He then distinctly expressed his doubt whether this would be sufficient to make the Nationalist attitude clear to the country and the advantage taken of our complaisance by the Bengalee to misrepresent the Nationalist attitude at Pabna shows that his apprehensions were perfectly justified. If this is the light in which the Moderates choose to put the Nationalist willingness to compromise, it may be necessary at the next Conference for our party not only to move an amendment but to put it to the vote regardless of Moderate threats of secession.

Futile Espionage

We wonder whether it is really impossible to maintain a great Empire without demoralising oneself and the country by means of an unworthy system of espionage. Since the initiation of the Swadeshi movement the army of spies and informers have grown as plentiful as insects round a bright light. Formerly men of some distinction had the honour of being watched in their houses, dogged in their goings, honoured by the private inspection of their correspondence. But nowadays it is enough to be suspected of patriotism to have the inefficient hirelings of the Police, if not the worthy guardians of the Law themselves, sticking like burs to one’s heels. Is anything gained by these excessive and no doubt costly precautions ? If we are to judge by the sorry specimens who have besieged us for the last six months, a more incapable creature than the ordinary Indian spy does not exist. He has an engaging simplicity of artifice which at once betrays his savoury vocation, and if he does not carry "spy" written legibly on his forehead, as a multitude of them do, he is so transparent in his methods that he might just as well be labelled, "Due at Royd Street". Nor do we quite see what is gained by watching a man’s house or his office with an open brazenness. The office of the Dharma¹ has recently been favoured with the loitering of watchers who spend their days gazing lovingly at the building and making affectionate and importunate enquiries as to the movements and habits of the editor. This open love-making strikes us as a little indecent; it would be better done behind a veil. And what do the authorities hope to gain by these unique researches ? Do they hope to see either bombs or packets of sedition being carried into the building ? Or is a leader of public agitation likely to convert his newspaper office or his house into an open resort of secret conspirators ? Even a bureaucracy ought to credit its political opponents with some little common sense, even if they cannot credit them with honesty of motive and frankness of action.

¹ A Bengali weekly edited by Sri Aurobindo from August, 1909 to February, 1910.

Convention Voyagers

We understand that some seven or eight faithful hearts are meditating the journey to Lahore to assist Mr. Madan Mohan Malaviya in carrying out Sir Pherozshah’s orders. We wish them a good voyage and a speedy repentance. One wonders, by the way, where the delegates of the Convention are going to start up from at the last moment. We watch in vain for the news of numerous elections all over the country. Secret conclaves, hushed-up quarrels, sittings with silent visitors, and, finally, secret elections seem to be the best features of Convention politics ! Or are the delegates ashamed of publishing their names ?